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IS THE FOOTBALL CULTURE OUT OF BOUNDS?
FINDING LIABILITY FOR KOREY STRINGER'S DEATH
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 2001, Minnesota Vikings football player
Korey Stringer died after collapsing from heat exhaustion.1 The
2
football industry and its fans mourned his death and asked "why?"
Despite the outcry of concern in 2001, players throughout the National Football League ("NFL") continue to suffer from heat-related illnesses at training camps. 3 Although other players have not
1. SeeJohn Levesque, NFL forced to redefine limits, SEArLE

POST-INTELLIGENCER,

July 31, 2003 (describing implications of Stringer's death), available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/levesque/133103_leve3l.html; see also Gary Mihoces & Larry
Weisman, Stringer's death rocks football world, USA TODAY.COM, at http://imet.csus.

edu/imet2/nicher/toohotwebquest/korey.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2004) (reporting Stringer's death). For a complete discussion of the facts surrounding
Stringer's death, see infra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
2. See Mihoces & Weisman, supra note 1 (describing grief shared by National
Football League, Minnesota Vikings coaches and teammates, players, coaches, and
fans throughout football); see also Dan Patrick, Tragedy raises questions, ESPN.coM, at

http://msn.espn.go.com/talent/danpatrick/s/2001/0802/1234435.html (Dec. 6,
2001) (reflecting on questions surrounding Stringer's death). Patrick calls
Stringer's death a tragedy that could have been prevented, and notes that more
than a day after the tragedy, "the question 'Why?' doesn't go away." Id.
3. Mike Freeman, Unusual Woman Presses Her Unusual Crusade, N.Y.

TIMES,

Sept. 26, 2003, at D2 [hereinafter Unusual Woman]. After Stringer's death, the
NFL increased efforts to educate their member clubs about heat exhaustion. See
Levesque, supra note 1 (noting NFL banned ephedra, known to exacerbate heat
illness, soon after Stringer's death). The NFL also asked all teams to review their
training camp policies. SeeJim Caple, An unhealthy sport, ESPN.coM, at http://msn.
espn.go.com/page2/s/caple/010802.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2004) (proposing
possible NFL actions post-Stringer's death); see also Joshua Freed, Korey Stringer's
widow plans to sue, at http://www.idsnews.com/story.php?id=17500 (July 28, 2003)
(describing NFL's steps before opening 2002 training camps, including meeting
with experts and leading discussions and seminars about heat exhaustion).
By the summer of 2003, the NFL's established response to a player who collapsed from the heat included removing the player's jersey and applying ice and
wet sponges to cool the player down. See Eddie Pells, Heat-relatedproblems crop up
again at some NFL training camps, at http://staugustine.com/stories/073103/spo_

1703461.shtml (last visited Nov. 29, 2004) (describing Jacksonville Jaguars' response when 328-pound defensive tackle John Henderson succumbed to heat).
Seattle Seahawks trainer, Paul Federici, has said that "[the trainers] look for the
physical signs of dehydration - muscle cramping or someone describing fatigue
....In extreme cases [the players] mental status will change a little bit in terms of
confusion, dizziness, and vision impairment." Levesque, supranote 1 (noting each
player responds to heat differently, but Federici's general concern heightens when
temperature hits 100 and humidity breaks 50 percent). Steve Mariucci, when still
head coach of the San Francisco 49ers, listed mass hydration breaks, rest breaks,
padless practices, and constant monitoring as ways his team battled the heat. He

(53)
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met the same fate as Stringer, concern throughout the football
world escalates with the increasing frequency of heat-related illnesses. 4 Heat-related illnesses are prevalent at all levels of athletics.
Years before taking the life of a professional athlete, heat exhaustion has taken the lives of high school and collegiate football
5
players.

added that if necessary, intravenous fluids are given to players. Mark Kreidler,
Tragedy won't stop athletes'push to the limit, ESPN.coM, at http://msn.espn.go.com/
nfl/columns/kreidlermark/1234262.html (Aug. 2, 2001). Steve Mariucci added
as an afterthought: "Part of that conditioning is pushing through it. Athletes don't
stop because they're a little sweaty, you know? Some of 'em [sic] are so darned
tough that they ignore the symptoms - try to push through it." Id. Only days after
Stringer's death, New England Patriots coach Bill Belichick complained that it was
not hot enough for their practices, observing: "You need the heat to get into
condition." Kate Randall, The NFL meat grinder: US pro football player dies in training camp, at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/aug2OO1/nfl-alO.shtml (Aug. 10,
2001).
4. Including Stringer's death, the NFL has seen a total of three player fatalities, but only Stringer's resulted from heat exhaustion. See Thomas George, Heat
Kills a Pro FootballPlayer; NFL. Orders a TrainingReview, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 2001, at
Al, D4. NFL injuries resulting from heat exposure, however, saw a significant increase in the summer of 2003. See Pells, supra note 3 (narrating circumstances of
NFL players hospitalized for heat exhaustion during first week of summer 2003
training camp, including two Jacksonville Jaguars players and four Washington
Redskins players). See generally Patrick, supra note 2 (noting problem of heat exhaustion); Caple, supra note 3 (discussing heat exhaustion concerns).
5. Although Stringer is the first professional football player to die from heat
exhaustion, eighteen high school and college football players have died from heat
stroke since 1995. See Mihoces & Weisman, supranote 1 (citing statistics from University of North Carolina's National Center for Catastrophic Sport Injury Research). There have been one hundred and five high school and college football
deaths resulting from heat exhaustion since 1955. See Roya R. Hekmat, Comment,
Malpractice During Practice: Should NCAA Coaches Be Liable For Negligence?, 22 LoY.
L.A. Er. L. REv. 613, 614 (2002) (citing statistics from National Center for Catastrophic Sport Injury Research).
The 2001 football season was particularly tragic. In addition to Stringer's
death, three college football players died from non-impact, indirect injuries. See
Sarah Lemons, Note, "Voluntary" Practices: The Last Gasp of Big-Time College Football
and the NCAA, 5 VAND. J. Ewr. L. & PRAc. 12, 12 (Winter 2002) (describing college
football injuries during non-mandatory practices). Eraste Autin, a freshman at the
University of Florida, died after collapsing of heat exhaustion at a voluntary offseason July practice. See id. at 13. Autin's body temperature was 108 degrees upon
arrival at the hospital, and the outside temperature that day was 88 degrees, humidity 72%, creating a combined heat index of 102 degrees. See id. Devaughn
Darling, a freshman at Florida State University, died after collapsing at a voluntary
off-season practice in February. See id. Darling's fellow players were not alarmed at
his collapse because it was commonplace to see players collapse in practices. See id.
Rashidi Wheeler, a football student-athlete at Northwestern, died of a fatal asthma
attack after pushing too hard at a summer "voluntary" practice. See id. at 13-14. A
video of the practice shows that the drill kept going the entire time Wheeler lay
prone and struggled to breathe, and the drill continued through emergency workers trying to revive Wheeler and save his life. See id. at 14.
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Analysts, coaches, and academics ask if the frequency of heatrelated illness in football indicates a larger problem. 6 Some believe
that football's leadership pushes players too hard, inevitably leading
to heat exhaustion and other non-contact injuries.7 Others believe
that while Stringer's death is tragic, players assume certain risks
when devoting their lives to the sport of football.8 Proponents of
this view believe that it requires 110% player effort to be a great
football player. 9 Furthermore, they believe that football players
push past their physical limitations in exchange for a chance at million dollar salaries, national fame, and superhero status.1 0
Stringer's widow, Kelci Stringer, filed a wrongful death lawsuit
against the NFL in the summer of 2003.11 The complaint stated
that "National Football League training camps are modern-day
sweat shops," and that the training camp conditions "not only are
condoned and perpetuated by the National Football League, but
also [are] ingrained in its culture, a perverse and deadly culture
that the League tolerates, fosters, and even markets."1 2 The conditions created by this "deadly culture" allegedly caused Korey
Stringer's heat exhaustion and subsequent death. 13 By bringing
6. For a discussion of the criticisms of football's culture, see infra notes 222-40
and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of the criticisms of football's culture, see infra notes 222-40
and accompanying text.
8. See generally Kreidler, supra note 3 (discussing risks taken by football players); see also Roy Pickering, Sports Casualties- Beethavean Scottland & Korey Stringer,at
http://www.suitel0l.com/article.cfm/6366/76853 (Aug. 7, 2001) (noting in football it is inevitable someone will be injured). Political shock-talker Bill Maher also
weighed in on the debate, insinuating that it is ridiculous for Kelci Stringer to sue
the NFL and the Vikings "for allowing the sun to shine on the field that day at
practices." Bill Maher, NFL to Korey Stringer: Drop Dead, at http://www.safesearching.com/billmaher/blog/archives/000006.html (July 29, 2003) (asserting certain
risks are ubiquitous for professional athletes and therefore cannot be given equal
treatment as other types of liability).
9. See Kreidler, supra note 3 ("The elite athletes, they push and they push and
they push because, well, hell, they do ....

On just about every level short of the

kind of tragedy visited upon the Stringer family, in fact, it is part and parcel of
what constitutes 'elite' in sport at all.").
10. For a discussion on why football players push 110%, see infra notes 210-21
and accompanying text.
11. See Complaint of Kelci Stringer, Stringer v. Nat'l Football League, Inc.
(S.D. Ohio July 28, 2003) (No. C2-03-665) [hereinafter Complaint]; Freed, supra
note 3 (reporting complaint was filed).
1-2, at 2-3.
12. Complaint, supra note 11,
13. See id. 2, at 3 (citing Stringer "being forced to participate fully in practices conducted in extreme heat and humidity while wearing unsafe, heat-retaining, league-mandated equipment, and without proper acclimatization, supervision,
or medical care" as example of conditions).
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this suit, Ms. Stringer escalated the scrutiny of the football culture

14
and called upon the federal court for a legal resolution.
This Comment examines the legal arguments and potential judicial responses to Ms. Stringer's lawsuit against the NFL. Section II
explains the facts of the case and summarizes the current status of
Ms. Stringer's suit against the Minnesota Vikings. 15 Section III provides a brief background of negligence legal principles and illustrates how various courts use these concepts in sports cases in
general, and heat exhaustion cases in particular. 16 Section IV analyzes the current debate surrounding the culture of football and
theorizes how these legal principles and cultural assertions potentially intersect to provide traditional and creative legal arguments in
the Stringer suit, the first wrongful death suit of its kind brought
1
against the NFL.

II.

7

FACTS AND POSTURE OF THE CASE

Korey Stringer entered his seventh professional football season
for the Minnesota Vikings at age twenty-seven. 1 8 Named to the Pro
Bowl team the season before, Stringer claimed he was in his best
physical shape ever entering the new season.1 9 On Monday, July 30,
2001, Stringer left the Vikings' first training camp practice in
Mankato, Minnesota, complaining of exhaustion. 20 Later that
night, Mike Tice, the offensive line coach at the time, allegedly
called Stringer a "big baby" for struggling with the heat and teased
14. See Unusual Woman, supra note 3, at D2 (illustrating Kelci Stringer's determination). In addition to monetary damages, Stringer seeks an injunction to compel the NFL to institute various policies: a mandatory schedule of gradual heat
acclimation, mandatory heat measurements, mandatory "black flag" (no practice)
days, mandatory hydration, water breaks, and ice pools, among other actions,
mandatory practice restrictions after exhibiting heat illness, and other mandatory
protocols for heat illness. See generally Complaint, supra note 11; see also Press Release, Class Action Led by Korey Stringer Family Seeks NFL Reform (July 28, 2003)
[hereinafter Press Release] (announcing Stringer's suit against NFL), available at
http://www.forrelease.com/D20030728/clm025.P1.07282003182942.24978.html.
15. For a discussion of the facts and posture of the Stringer case, see infta
notes 18-41 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the applicable legal concepts in heat exhaustion and
"cultural negligence" cases such as Stringer's, see infra notes 42-201 and accompanying text.
17. For an analysis of football's culture and potential legal arguments on behalf of Stringer, see infra notes 202-99 and accompanying text.
18. See George, supra note 4, at Al (stating Stringer was six feet, four inches
tall and 335 pounds).
19. See id. at D4 (noting Vikings' head coach Dennis Green believed Stringer
was one of top seven or eight players in entire NFL).
20. See id. at Al (illustrating Stringer being carted off football field).
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Stringer with a newspaper picture showing Stringer doubled over at
21
practice.
On Tuesday, July 31, 2001, the temperature exceeded 90 de22
grees, and with the humidity, the heat index reached 110 degrees.
During practice, Stringer vomited three times, complained of weakness and dizziness, momentarily collapsed during a drill, and
breathed heavily when he walked himself to an air-conditioned
tent.23 The trainer in the tent with Stringer observed his condition
and offered him water, but did not measure Stringer's vital signs or
obtain a medical history of his case from anyone.2 4 Stringer remained in the tent on an examining table, with the trainer present,
for forty-five minutes, until the trainer called for a cart to take
Stringer back to practice. 25 When Stringer rose to meet the cart, he
suddenly laid down on the ground and became unresponsive. 26 At
this point, the trainer summoned additional help and applied ice
towels to Stringer's body. 27 When Stringer arrived at Immanuel St.
Joseph's-Mayo Health System, his temperature had reached 108.8
29
degrees. 28 He died early the next morning.
Based on these summarized facts, Stringer's widow, Kelci
Stringer, filed a lawsuit against the Minnesota Vikings and other
parties.3 0 In a Memorandum and Order, the Hennepin County
District Court of Minnesota granted summary judgment to the Vik31
ings on all counts.

21. See Allegations levied, Stringerfamily announces $100M suit against Vikings,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,Jan. 15, 2002 [hereinafter Allegations levied], availableat http:/
/sportsillustrated.cnn.com/football/news/2002/01 / 15 / s tringe r-lawsuit-ap/.

Mike Tice is now the head football coach of the Minnesota Vikings. See id.
22. See George, supra note 4, at D4 (reporting National Weather Service declares heat indices at 105 or higher dangerous for heat stroke).

23. See id. at Al (describing Stringer's battle with heat exhaustion before his
death).
24. See Memorandum and Order at 17, Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football
Club, LLC. (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 25, 2003) (No. 02-00415) [hereinafter Memorandum & Order] (noting observations by training staff of Stringer's condition at time
of collapse and immediately thereafter, but further noting limited medical attention administered by Vikings' training staff).
25. See id. (describing facts of case).
26. See id. at 17-18 (describing facts of case).
27. See id. at 18 (describing facts of case).
28. See George, supra note 4 (describing Stringer's temperature).
29. See id. (detailing facts).
30. See generally Memorandum & Order, supra note 24, at 1 (documenting commencement of Kelci Stringer's lawsuit).
31. See id. at 2-4. In December 2003, the court also ordered the Stringer family to repay the Vikings and other defendants $47,588.03 in legal expenses. See
Margaret Zack, Judge orders Stringers to pay lawsuit costs, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB.,
Dec. 12, 2003, at 2B (reporting Hennepin County District Court decision). On
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When a professional athlete is injured or dies, state workers'
compensation laws provide the exclusive remedy for the injury, no
differently than when a factory worker is injured or dies.3 2 In order
to avoid Minnesota's workers' compensation bar against a common
law remedy, Ms. Stringer needed to prove that each of the Vikings
defendants owed her husband a personal duty and that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that each defendant's conduct was
grossly negligent based on the evidence. 33 The court held that
each of the Vikings defendants acted toward Stringer within their
scope of employment and no one owed him a personal duty.34 In

addition, the court found insufficient evidence to support a reasonable finding of gross negligence against any of the Vikings defendants, even when viewing the evidence most favorably to the
35
plaintiffs.

September 21, 2004, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota affirmed the Hennepin
County District Court decision. See Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football Club, LLC.,
686 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
32. See Thomas R. Hurst &James N. Knight, Coaches' Liabilityfor Athletes' Injuries and Deaths, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 27, 29-30 (2003) (describing that in
Stringer case, Minnesota workers' compensation statute states that employers and
co-workers are shielded from liability unless injury resulted from 'gross negligence'
or 'intentional harm'; further contemplating difficulty in proving gross negligence
or intentional harm in Stringer's death since extreme heat is common in football
practices and death from heat exhaustion is not common).
33. See Memorandum & Order, supra note 24, at 5, 55. For a discussion of workers' compensation exclusivity, see infra note 38 and accompanying text.
34. See Memorandum & Order, supra note 24, at 5-6, 55-80 (addressing each
Vikings defendant and finding no personal duty owed). Minnesota case law holds
personal duty exists "when a co-employee takes an affirmative, voluntary step to act
in a manner that exceeds the scope of his or her usual employment responsibilities." Id. at 61. The Court of Appeals of Minnesota disagreed on this issue, finding
that assistant trainer Paul Osterman and coordinator of medical services Fred
Zamberletti did have a personal duty to Stringer; however, they "nevertheless exercised more than a scant level of care" and accordingly, were not grossly negligent.
Stringer, 686 N.W.2d at 549-51, 553 (affirming Hennepin County District Court
decision).
35. See Memorandum & Order, supra note 24, at 6, 55-80 (addressing each Vikings defendant and finding no individual conduct that constituted gross negligence). Gross negligence in Minnesota "occurs when a person does not pay the
slightest attention to the consequences, or uses no care at all." Id. at 61.
The court insulated the Vikings' affirmative defenses of comparative negligence, assumption of risk, and pre-existing condition in the event that its decision
is reversed in the future. See id. at 7 (denying plaintiffs motion to dismiss defendants' affirmative defenses). The court found a reasonable jury could find sufficient
evidence to support these defenses, which rely in part on the allegations that
Stringer had taken ephedra before practice and did not arrive at training camp in
appropriate physical condition. See id. at 7, 94-95 (noting Kelci Stringer testified
that Korey Stringer regularly used supplements containing ephedra prior to
games, despite knowing dangers of ephedra).
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The Minnesota workers' compensation statute severely limited
36
the potential remedy Ms. Stringer could recover from the Vikings.
In order to overcome the exclusivity doctrine, which bars an employee from seeking common law action against an employer, the
law required Ms. Stringer to meet a heavy burden; she had to prove
37
both personal duty and gross negligence. The gross negligence in
Minnesota is defined as slight care with no concern (almost no

to do
care), therefore, any evidence that the defendants attempted
38
doctrine.
exclusivity
their job is sufficient to uphold the
Legal experts predicted that no matter the outcome of the Vikings suit, an important legal precedent could be established to determine how teams protect "peewee" to professional football
players in the future.3 9 The failure of the Vikings lawsuit did not
36. Legal remedies for injured professional football players are governed by
four factors: 1) the state workers' compensation law; 2) the collective bargaining
agreement between the NFL and the NFL Players Association; 3) the contract between the injured player and his team; and 4) common law tort theories. See Halcomb Lewis, An Analysis of Brown v. National Football League, 9 VILL. SPORTS &
ENr. L.J. 263, 264 n.3 (2002).
37. State workers' compensation statutes provide the largest hurdle to a professional football player wanting to sue his team. Workers' compensation statutes
include an intentional tort exception. See R. Brian Crow & Scott R. Rosner, Institutional and OrganizationalLiability for Hazing in Intercollegiate and Professional Team
Sports, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. Riv. 87, 106 (2002) (explaining legal barriers that accompany workers' compensation statutes). For the employee to escape the confined
remedies under worker compensations laws, the employer must have acted intentionally or deliberately with the intent to harm the employee. See id. at 106-07
(defining intentional tort).
38. In Minnesota, the workers' compensation statute provides for more than
66% of the worker's pay, capped at a certain amount, plus $15,000 towards burial
costs. See Hurst & Knight, supranote 32, at 30. While most states treat professional
athletes the same as all other workers under workers' compensation statutes, Massachusetts and Florida specifically exclude covering professional athletes from
workers' compensation coverage. See Lewis, supra note 36, at 265 n.4. Workers'
compensation statutes commonly include an exclusivity doctrine barring an employee from seeking a remedy under common law. See id. at 266 n.7 (articulating
barriers to suing NFL teams). Although the exclusivity doctrine bars common law
action against an employer, a plaintiff can pursue a common law action from responsible third parties. See id. at 271-72 (noting Stringer will need to sue NFL via
third party suit). In a recent antitrust dispute, the NFL itself argued that the
league and its member clubs (the teams) were a single entity. The court, however,
found that NFL member clubs "are 'separate economic entities engaged in a joint

venture."' Id. at 272-73.
39. See Andy Hemmer, Maximum Blitz: Attorney Stan Chesley throws weight behind
Mar. 29, 2002, available at http://
$100 million lawsuit, CINCINNATI Bus. COURIER,200
2
/O 4 /O1/story2.html. "The recincinnati.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/stories/
some of these macho guys
force
to
policy
mandatory
a
enact
teams
that
be
may
sult
to take a break from the heat ....Guys don't want to look like the weenie. But if
they're all forced to do it, they're all gonna [sic] do it." See id. (quoting Rob
Becker, New York attorney and analyst for Fox Sports).
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deter Kelci Stringer. 40 She next filed a negligence lawsuit against
the National Football League. 4 1
III.

BACKGROUND

To win a negligence lawsuit, the plaintiff must prove four ele-

ments. 42 First, the plaintiff must show that the defendant owed the

plaintiff a duty to maintain a certain level of care. 43 This duty of
care usually requires that the defendant act in the same manner
that a reasonable person would act in similar circumstances. 44 Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant did not provide the
requisite level of care owed to the plaintiff.45 The plaintiff can es-

tablish that the defendant breached his or her duty of care by providing evidence that the defendant's conduct failed to conform to
the reasonable person standard. 46 Third, the breach by the defendant must actually and proximately cause the plaintiffs injury. 47 Fi40. See Unusual Woman, supra note 3, at D1 (portraying Kelci Stringer as ambitious and focused on goal to change NFL training camps). For a description of the
complaint allegations, see supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
41. See Unusual Woman, supra note 3, at D2 (describing Kelci Stringer's unwavering devotion to belief that culture surrounding football must change). At the
time of this article, Kelci Stringer was in the process of gathering other parties to
join her class action suit against the NFL. See generally Register, Big Class Action, at
http://www.bigclassaction.com/class-action/koreystringer.html (last visited Nov.
29, 2004) (encouraging readers to join Stringer lawsuit if they feel they qualify for
similar remedy).
42. See Hekmat, supra note 5, at 616 (defining negligence); see also Donald T.
Meier, Note, Primary Assumption of Risk and Duty in Football Indirect Injury Cases: A
Legal Workout From the Tragedies on the Training Ground for American Values, 2 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. LJ. 80, 101 (2002) (describing legal principles relevant to Rashidi
Wheeler's and Stringer's wrongful death suits).
43. See Griggs v. BIC Corp., 981 F.2d 1429, 1434 (3d Cir. 1992) (defining elements of negligence in Pennsylvania); McElhaney v. Monroe, C.A. No. 13454, 1989
Ohio App. LEXIS 366, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 1, 1989), mot. overruled, 539
N.E.2d 166 (1989) (listing components of negligence in Ohio); Hekmat, supra
note 5, at 616 (listing components of negligence suit).
44. See Hekmat, supra note 5, at 616 (describing reasonable person standard
as minimum level of care that "requires a person to avoid creating unreasonable
risks of injury to others").
45. In other words, the defendant breached the duty of care. See Hekmat, supra
note 5, at 616 (listing components of negligence suit); see also Criggs, 981 F.2d at
1434 (defining elements of negligence in Pennsylvania); McElhaney, 1989 Ohio
App. LEXIS 366, at *34 (listing components of negligence in Ohio); Hekmat,
supra note 5, at 617 (quoting GEORGE W. SCHUBERT, ET AL., SPORTS LAw § 7, at 182
(1986)) ("If a person realizes or should realize that their conduct exposes another
to an unreasonable risk of injury from third parties, animals or forces of nature,
then he or she will be negligent for acting in that manner.").
46. See Hekmat, supra note 5, at 617 (describing reasonable person standard).
47. See Griggs, 981 F.2d at 1434 (defining elements of negligence in Pennsylvania); see also McElhaney, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 366, at *4 (listing components
of negligence in Ohio); Hekmat, supra note 5, at 616-17 (noting defendant may
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48
The injury must
nally, the plaintiff must die or sustain injury.

49
significantly impact the victim; a nominal injury is not sufficient.
This Section explores the major legal concepts frequently discussed in negligence cases. 50 Part A examines what factors deter51
mine if a defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff. Part B
briefly comments on public policy arguments that may also influence a court's finding of duty. 52 Part C explains the assumption of
risk affirmative defense that many defendants assert in negligence
cases.5 3 Finally, Part D discusses the theory of inherent compulsion,
54
an approach New York courts use in negligence analysis.

A.

Duty of Care in Negligence Cases

55
Duty of care is the central concept in negligence cases. Two
essential factors in determining both whether a duty of care exists
and the level of care required are the existence of a special relation-

still be liable even if his or her breach is not sole cause of injury, but made substantial contribution to injury). When establishing negligence, injuries that were not
foreseeable, but instead, pre-existed and were aggravated by the alleged breach of
duty, may be included in the claim. See Hekmat, supra note 5, at 617.
48. See Griggs, 981 F.2d at 1434 (defining elements of negligence in Pennsylvania); see also McElhaney, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 366, at *4 (listing components
of negligence in Ohio); Meier, supra note 42, at 101 (explaining most negligence
cases hinge not upon this component, but instead upon showing duty of care and
breach of that duty).
49. See Hekmat, supra note 5, at 618 (describing damages as most conspicuous
element of negligence).
50. Because the Stringer case will largely turn on whether or not the NFL
owed Stringer a duty of care, this Comment does not explore the second, third,
and fourth elements in the negligence case. If a duty is found, then the breach of
that duty is a factual question for the fact finder, and the causation element will
turn on whether or not the NFL breach of duty contributed to Stringer's heat
exhaustion. There is little doubt that the injury requirement in this case has been
satisfied. For a listing of negligence elements, see supranotes 42-49 and accompanying text.
51. For a discussion of duty of care, see infra notes 55-123 and accompanying
text.
52. For a discussion of public policy considerations in duty of care decisions,
see infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
53. For a discussion of the assumption of risk doctrine, see infra notes 131-61
and accompanying text.
54. For a discussion of inherent compulsion, see infra notes 162-201 and accompanying text.
55. See Griggs v. BIC Corp., 981 F.2d 1429, 1435 (3d Cir. 1992) (differentiating elements of negligence and strict liability cases); see also Brown v. Day, 588
N.E.2d 973, 974 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (dismissing negligence claim against university-defendant when university had no knowledge of student-defendant's violent
tendencies).
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ship between the defendant and the plaintiff and the foreseeability
56
of risk in the activity.
Defendants in authoritative roles, such as supervisors, administrators, and coaches, commonly have a special relationship with athletes because they are often in the best position to prevent injury. 5 7
Accordingly, defendants in authoritative roles are often held more
accountable because they can control the conduct of the activity.58
Moreover, authorities involved in inherently dangerous activities,
such as football, are frequently held to heightened accountability. 59
The heightened duty of care in football requires coaches to give
both adequate and non-negligent warnings, instruction, and
supervision.

60

When analyzing the foreseeability of risk, courts traditionally
apply a risk-utility analysis that weighs "the risk, in light of the social
value of the interest threatened, and the probability and extent of
the harm . ...

"61

In football, coaches must warn players and pro-

tect them from foreseeable injury, even when the injury occurs in
an unforeseeable manner. 62 Coaches must instruct players in a
56. See McElhaney v. Monroe, C.A. No. 13454, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 366, at
*4 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 1, 1989) ("[D]uty centers upon whether the plaintiffs interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct."); Hekmat,
supra note 5, at 616-17 (noting while "minimum duty of care requires a person to
avoid creating unreasonable risks of injury to others", heightened duty of care "imposes a duty of care to protect against those risks that the [defendant] did not
create").
57. See Hekmat, supra note 5, at 617 (describing heightened duty of care on
authoritative figures).
58. See id. (noting when courts will impose heightened duty of care).
59. See id. at 617, 619 (emphasizing heightened duty of care for inherently
dangerous activities including football); see also Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964,
967 (N.Y. 1986) (stating plaintiffs reasonable expectations of duty owed to him
were "particularly true in professional sporting contests" because of increased
danger).
60. See Meier, supra note 42, at 102 (describing broad duty of care).
61. Griggs v. BIC Corp., 981 F.2d 1429, 1436 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting W. PAGE
KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 31, at 173 (5th ed.
1984)) (footnotes omitted).
62. See id. at 1435 ("[A] conclusion that a duty exists under negligence law
expresses the existence of foreseeability of harm and serves as a predicate for fault
....
"); see also Hekmat, supra note 5, at 619 (applying negligence law to college
football). At least one jurisdiction has held that a defendant breached a duty of
care when defendant negligently caused serious mental distress where the mental
distress was reasonably foreseeable. See Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 765 (Haw.
1974) (concluding legal protection from negligent infliction of serious mental distress exists in tort system). If a defendant can be expected to reasonably foresee
serious mental distress, it follows that a defendant could also be expected to reasonably foresee heat exhaustion. Unlike mental distress, heat exhaustion exhibits
physical manifestations. For a discussion of the physical manifestations of heat

exhaustion, see infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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63 Coaches must sumanner that does not create additional risks.
pervise their players proportionately to the amount of risk inherent

in the activity. 64 A coach will more likely fulfill his or her duty to

players by providing safe equipment, timely medical care, and concern and attention to injuries. 65 The precise level of care a coach
needs to give decreases as the age, skill, and experience of the play66
ers increase.
General Application of Duty of Care Principles
The Third Circuit recently framed the duty of care issue in in67 Drew
direct injury cases in Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College.
Kleinknecht, who was twenty years old, died after collapsing at a
68
lacrosse practice at Gettysburg College. Medical evidence showed
69 The nearest
that the collapse resulted from a heart arrhythmia.
telephone to call for help sat 200 to 250 yards away,70 and at the time
of the collapse, no one at the practice knew CPR.
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania granted summary judgment to Gettysburg College,
finding that the college owed no special duty of care to
Kleinknecht. 71 On appeal, the Third Circuit remanded, finding a
special relationship existed between the college and Kleinknecht
1.

72
The Third Circuit pointed
"in his capacity as a school athlete."

63. See Bereswill v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, Inc., 719 N.Y.S.2d 231, 232 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2001) (holding because defendant did not enhance any existing risks
present at basketball game, defendant did not owe duty to plaintiff); see also Knight
v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1992) ("[I]t is well established that defendants
generally do have a duty to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant
over and above those inherent in the sport.").
64. See Hekmat, supra note 5, at 619 (quoting GEORGE W. SCHUBERT, ET AL.,
their
SPORTS LAw § 7, at 176 (1986)) (commenting that coaches must supervise
players proportionately to danger inherent in activity, because coaches have duty
to warn against dangers that "should have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable care").
65. See id. (providing other factors when assessing coaches' liability).
66. See id. (explaining that coaches' liability will decrease as players' ages increase); see also Crohn v. Congregation B'Nai Zion, 317 N.E.2d 637, 641 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1974) (stating it is common knowledge that higher duty of care exists with
respect to defendants responsible for children because children are not capable of
exercising same level of care for their safety as adults are).
67. 989 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1993).
68. See Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1363 (describing facts of case).
69. See id. at 1365 (identifying injury).
70. See id. at 1363 (describing facts of case).
71. See id. at 1362 (recounting lower court's holding). The court is to decide
whether or not, as a matter of law, the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. See id. at 1366.
72. See id. at 1375 (stating holding and remanding case to District Court to
determine whether College breached its duty of care).
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out that at the time of the injury, Kleinknecht was not engaged in
his private affairs as a student, but was instead participating in a
collegiate athletic event under the supervision of college employees. 73 The court conceded that the college athlete-coach relationship was not as close as a high school athlete-coach relationship,
which demands a more compelling duty of care.7 4 Because the college actively recruited Kleinknecht to play lacrosse, the court held
that the duty of care required was similar to a high school athletecoach relationship. 75 The court followed Wissel v. Ohio High School
Athletic Ass'n,76 labeled any argument that says an organization that
decides the rules and equipment used in an event owes no reasonable care to athletes as "incongruous." 77
In addition, the Third Circuit explained that the plaintiff must
demonstrate only "the likelihood of the occurrence of a general
type of risk rather than the likelihood of the occurrence of the precise chain of events leading to the injury." 78 While the court conceded it impossible to guard against every possible risk, it held that
the defendant had a duty to reasonably guard against generally
foreseeable hazards. 79 The court found the college's failure to protect against possible harms from injury during practices unreasonable, stating that although it is atypical for a college athlete to
collapse, the occurrence was "within a reasonably foreseeable class
of unfortunate events" that might arise during an athletic
practice.8 0
73. See Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1367 (noting other states have found similar
special duty of care between colleges and recruited athletes).
74. See id. at 1367 n.5 (distinguishing public, pre-college school coach as having closer relationship with student athlete than college coach with student
athlete).
75. See id. at 1375 (discussing court's holding).
76. 605 N.E.2d 458 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
77. Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1369 (citing Wissel v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, 605 N.E.2d 458 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)). "The fact that these organizations
purport to act gratuitously and for noble purposes does not, ipso facto, absolve
them of a legal duty of care toward the athletes." Id.
78. Id. (exploring foreseeability).
79. See id. at 1370 (conceding difficulty in predicting all possible dangers).
80. Id. at 1372. The Third Circuit quoted Leahy v. Sch. Bd. of Hernando County,
450 So. 2d 883, 885 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), which held that reasonable care
should include "giving adequate instruction in the activity, supplying proper
equipment, making a reasonable selection or matching of participants, providing
non-negligent supervision of the particular contest, and taking proper post-injury
procedures to protect against aggravation of the injury." Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at
1371 (listing actions coaches should take in order to maintain reasonable care).
Whether or not the college breached this duty of care or acted reasonably is for a
jury to determine. See id. at 1373.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol12/iss1/3

12

Charnley: Is the Football Culture out of Bounds - Finding Liability for Kor

2005]
2.

LIABILITY FOR KOREY STRINGER'S DEATH

Application in Heat Exhaustion Cases

Heat exhaustion (also known as heat stroke) is easily recognizable from its symptoms: muscle cramps, headaches, dizziness, nausea, vomiting, flushed dry skin, blurred vision, and a loss of
consciousness. 8 1 Additionally, overweight people are more likely to
suffer from heat exhaustion because their bodies absorb heat more
readily.8 2 A heat exhaustion victim's fate depends upon how
83
quickly cooling methods are applied. The most effective cooling
method is water immersion, but if unavailable or not advisable due
to the age or health of the victim, a fan, a cool wet cloth, or an ice
pack can also be effective. 84 If the body's core temperature is not
can suffer multiple organ complications
reduced quickly, the victim
85
death.
and ultimately
86 PrevenThe key to battling heat exhaustion is prevention.
tion is best achieved through fluid replacement, acclimatization,
87 To properly replace
proper dress, and cool work environments.
fluids, athletes should drink sixteen ounces of water before exercis88
ing and eight ounces every twenty minutes during exercise.
Healthy people become acclimatized after seven to ten days of be81. See Niomi Bauer, et al., Heat Stroke: As Related to the Death of Korey Stringer,

J., Sept. 2002, at 1 (discussing symptoms of heat
stroke), available at http://www.umary.edu/PDF/UMHPJVol2Issuel.pdf.
82. See Gehling v. St. George's Univ. Sch. of Med., Ltd., 705 F. Supp. 761, 764
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (listing proposition as finding of fact); see also Selena Roberts,
N.F.L. "sPerniciousCulture of Obesity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2003, § 8, at 5 [hereinafter
Culture of Obesity] (describing dangers of NFL's culture of obesity).
83. See Bauer, supra note 81, at 4 (emphasizing patient should be taken to
hospital immediately).
84. See id. (explaining cooling methods).
85. See id. (noting risks if body temperature not cooled).
86. See id. (discussing prevention of heat exhaustion). In order to prevent
heat exhaustion, NFL coaches and trainers follow guidelines established by the
National Athletic Trainers' Association ("NATA"). See Randall, supra note 3 (noting following Stringer's death, NATA recommended to NFL that teams not practice in hot temperatures, but NFL has not adopted recommendation).
87. See Bauer, supra note 81, at 4 (listing methods to prevent heat exhaustion). Many NFL players at training camp will take a break for a wet towel on the
back of his neck in order to deal with the heat. See Paul Attner, Despite precautions,
camp conditions put players at risk, SPORTINGNEWS.coM, at http://web.archive.org/
web/ 20010805014709/ http: / /www.sportingnews.com /voices/ paul-attner/
20010801.html (Aug. 1, 2001) (describing common sights at NFL training camps).
88. See Bauer, supra note 81, at 4 (stressing importance of fluids). One sports
analyst said that practicing without water breaks is a tradition of the past. See
Attner, supra note 87 (commenting that in past, it was considered "less than manly"
to take water break during practice). In more serious situations, NFL players get
intravenous (I.V.) transfusions to replenish fluids. See id. (commenting "that kind
of Neanderthal thinking has given way to a much more enlightened approach").
UNIV. OF MARY HEALTH PROFS.
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ing in a particular climate.8 9 Wearing light colored, loose fitting,
lightweight clothing is recommended in warmer climates.9 0 Working in shaded areas or at times of day when the temperature is
cooler also helps prevent heat exhaustion. 9 1
Before Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,92 which decided that federal courts should apply state common law in cases not arising out
of the United States Constitution or Acts of Congress, the Supreme
Court addressed how heat exhaustion should be viewed within the
framework of federal tort law. 93 In Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life
Insurance Co.,9 4 the majority distinguished between death caused by
accidental means and death as an accidental result.9 5 The Court

held that sunstroke is a means by which injury occurs and because
the plaintiff voluntarily exposed himself to the sun's rays, the injury
was not caused by accidental means. 96 Justice Cardozo dissented,
arguing that the sun's rays should be viewed as the first step setting
causation in motion, resulting in accidental injury. 9 7 He warned
against trying to distinguish sunstroke from a simple accidental
death.9 8
More recently in Mogabgab v. Orleans Parish School Board,99 the
parents of a high school football player brought a wrongful death
suit after their son died of heat exhaustion during a football prac89. See Bauer, supra note 81, at 4 (defining acclimation).
90. See id. (recommending specific clothing to prevent heat exhaustion).
91. See id. (stressing to avoid hottest times of day to prevent heat exhaustion).
92. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
93. See Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 494 (1934)
(describing plaintiff golfer who suffered and died from sunstroke). But see Lang v.
N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 581 F. Supp. 1, 1-2 (D.NJ. 1982), rev'd, 721 F.2d 118 (3d Cir.
1983) (noting because Landress was decided before Erie, case now has little value).
94. 291 U.S. 491 (1934).
95. See id. at 497 (describing external means when stipulated cause of injury
was from external source, and external result when conditions external to plaintiffs body contributed to injury). Here, decedent's wife sued her husband's life
insurance company for payment on his accidental death policy, which was to pay
out if he died by "external, violent and accidental means." Id. at 495. She argued
that death caused by sun exposure was "accidental" in the popular sense of the
term, and that she was therefore entitled to the money when her husband died of
sunstroke. See id. at 495-96.
96. See id. (holding although resulting death was accidental, sunstroke resulted from voluntary exposure to sun). But see Wickman v. Northwestern Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1085-86 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1013
(1990) (rejecting Landress distinction between accidental means and accidental
results).
97. See Landress, 291 U.S. at 498-99 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (arguing sunstroke is, in "common language," accidental death).
98. See id. at 499 (cautioning that this distinction could "plunge this branch of
the law into a Serbonian Bog").
99. 239 So. 2d 456 (La. Ct. App. 1970).
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tice. The parents claimed that the coaches did not provide prompt
medical care.10 0 The Louisiana appeals court overturned summary
judgment granted in favor of the defendant, finding that the
coaches failed to get medical help in a reasonable time after
Mogabgab first became faint during practice. 10 ' Mogabgab collapsed from heat exhaustion at 5:20 p.m., but did not go to the
hospital until 7:15 p.m. after his mother, not the coaches, called a
doctor after arriving on the scene.1 0 2 In a significant decision, the
court recognized the progressive nature of heat exhaustion injuries.103 It held that the failure to obtain prompt medical attention
after the onset of heat exhaustion caused the injury because at
some point during the progressing injury the damage to the body
became irreversible.10 4 In the court's view, Mogabgab would likely
have lived but for the coaches' failure to provide prompt medical
care.

10 5

In Gehling v. St. George's University School of Medicine, Ltd.,10 6 the
plaintiff suffered from heat stroke and died after participating in a
"fun run" organized by his medical school. 10 7 On the day of the
run, the temperature exceeded eighty degrees, with high humidity. l0 8 The court held that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff because the school did not control, monitor, or supervise the
race.10 9 The court further held that even if there was a duty, the
school did not cause the plaintiff's death." 0 Rather, the plaintiff's
100. See Mogabgab, 239 So. 2d at 457 (describing claim).
101. See id. at 460-61 (giving holding of case).
102. See id. at 458 (listing defendants' admissions).
103. See id. at 460 (synthesizing medical evidence of case); see also Hurst &
Knight, supra note 32, at 37 (identifying critical part of holding). But see Gehling v.
St. George's Univ. Sch. of Med., Ltd., 705 F. Supp. 761, 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that heat stroke is frequently fatal even when immediate care is given, thus, no
credible evidence that plaintiff would have lived had he had immediate care); but
cf Hanson v. Kynast, 494 N.E.2d 1091, 1096-97 (Ohio 1986) (upholding summary
judgment for defendant after no evidence presented that delay in treatment negatively effected plaintiffs head injury).
104. See Mogabgab, 239 So. 2d at 460 ("If [appropriate medical assistance] is
long delayed, there is little hope."). For a discussion of the progressive nature of
heat exhaustion injury, see supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
105. See Mogabgab,239 So. 2d at 460-61 (summarizing medical record); see also
Hurst & Knight, supra note 32, at 37 (detailing court awarding damages to
Mogabgab).
106. 705 F. Supp. 761 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
107. See Gehling, 705 F. Supp. at 763 (describing facts of case).
108. See id. (summarizing facts of case).
109. See id. at 766 (giving holding of case).
110. See id. at 766-67 (noting holding of case).
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overweight condition caused his death, not any condition caused by
the defendant. 1 '
3.

Common Bars to Heat Exhaustion Cases

Many claims for heat exhaustion injuries that occur during
public school athletic events and practices turn on other grounds,
especially state immunity statutes.' 2 In one such case, Princev. Louisville Municipal School District,113 the plaintiff alleged that he suffered heat exhaustion -during football practice because the coaches
failed to monitor his health, provide necessary liquids, and provide
medical care. 114 For Prince to overcome state immunity, which
would bar any action against parties acting in a state capacity, he
had to show that the coaches acted beyond the scope of their discretionary functions. 1 5 The court upheld the lower court's dismissal based upon state immunity, finding that there was no evidence
the coaches "did anything beyond exercising ordinary discretion." 116 The dissent contended that the court wrongly extended
state immunity to include medical care as a discretionary function,
111. See id. (stating conclusion about cause of death). The case insinuates
that Gehling's failure to control his overweight condition contributed to him not

safely finishing the "fun run." See id. at 766. Many NFL players, including Korey
Stringer, are required by their NFL contracts to maintain a weight that is considered obese and unhealthy. For a discussion of this trend within the NFL, see infra
notes 238-40 and accompanying text.
112. See Prince v. Louisville Mun. Sch. Dist., 741 So. 2d 207, 210 (Miss. 1999)
(deciding scope of Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-1, which provided limited waiver of
sovereign immunity in tort claims); see also Vargo v. Svithchan, 301 N.W.2d 1, 3
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (discussing scope of MICH. COMP. LAW § 691.1407 (MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 3.996(107)) that provides state employee protections). Another bar
to heat exhaustion cases is evidential insufficiency. See Draughton v. Harnett
County Bd. of Educ., 580 S.E.2d 732, 737 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003), affd, 582 S.E.2d
343 (N.C. 2004) (holding that plaintiffs death from complications of heat stroke
after collapse at football practice lacked sufficient evidentiary support to meet
prima facie case).
113. 741 So. 2d 207 (Miss. 1999).
114. See Prince, 741 So. 2d at 209 (stating facts of case).
115. See id. at 211 (discussing Alabama past cases based on state immunity).
Alabama considers maintaining good order and discipline of the team, deciding if
a player is injured, and deciding whether or not a player needs medical attention is
all within a coach's discretionary role. See id. at 212 (describing Alabama Supreme
Court's definition of coach's job); see also Sorey v. Kellett, 673 F. Supp 817 (S.D.
Miss. 1987), rev'd, 849 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1988) (dismissing claim against university
where plaintiff-student fell ill at football practice and subsequently died); Barrett v.
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 32 P.3d 1156, 1162 (Kan. 2001) (holding where plaintiff collapsed at first football practice of season and subsequently died, claim can
only advance if gross or wanton negligence present because ordinary negligence
claim barred by state immunity clause).
116. See Prince, 741 So. 2d at 212 (noting finding in lower court).
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and therefore, the coaches in the case did have a duty of care to the
plaintiff. 117
The dissent's contention in Prince provided the foundation of
the majority's opinion in Vargo v. Svithchan.1"8 In Vargo, a fifteenyear-old student was rendered paraplegic after a 250 to 300 pound
weight fell on him during a weight lifting session for a school football team tryout. 11 9 In the complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the
principal and athletic director were negligent by allowing the football coach "to abuse students and to threaten and pressure them
into attempting athletic feats beyond their capabilities .... 12 0 The
court said that the school officials' protection under the immunity
statute turned on whether their actions were discretionary.1 2 Relying on a prior decision, the court held the immunity statute did not
protect the principal because, among other reasons, the principal
was ultimately responsible for the summer weight lifting program
and should have minimized the potential injury in such a program,
including the "overexertion and resultant injuries [which] are fore22
seeable and frequent in the absence of proper supervision."'
Largely based on the same rationale, the court also denied state
immunity for the athletic director because he was "in a position and
authority to oversee the practices," "promulgate[ ] reasonable
123
safety precautions," and "minimize[ ] injury to the students."
Besides the traditional duty elements and absolute bars to a
finding of duty, public policy considerations frequently impact
24
whether a court finds there is a duty of care owed to a plaintiff.'
B.

Public Policy Influences in Assessing Duty

Courts decide whether defendants owe a duty based on the total of all policy influences. 25 The Third Circuit in Kleinknecht advanced a public policy position, noting that the Supreme Court of
117. See id. at 214-15 (Banks, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's decision to extend immunity to coaches).
118. 301 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
119. See Vargo, 301 N.W.2d at 3 (describing facts).
120. Id. (summarizing allegations).
121. See id. at 4 (defining discretionary acts as "those of a legislative, executive
or judicial nature").
122. Id. at 5 (denying principal-defendant immunity and remanding case to
decide principal's negligence).
123. Id. at 5, 8 (remanding case to decide if athletic director in fact
negligent).
124. For a discussion of public policy influences on findings of duty, see infra
notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
125. See Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 764 (Haw. 1974) (defining duty as
"a legal conclusion dependant upon 'the sum total of those considerations of pol-
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Pennsylvania stated when "deci[ding] whether or not there is a
duty, many factors interplay: The hand of history, our ideas of
morals and justice, the convenience of administration of the rule,
and our social ideas as to where the loss should fall." 126 When determining duty of care in negligence cases, courts consider every
possible public policy that may escalate the risk of death or injury,
including heightened pressures to succeed and the effects of group
psychology.1 27 In this sense, courts commonly balance moral and
ethical considerations, weighing the nature of the relationship, the
gravity of the harm, and the reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct.

128

If there is a potential economic gain for the defendant, the
court will consider if the defendant must protect the plaintiff in
some way because of that economic motivation.1 2 9 For example,
the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") and college
football coaches may deem pre-season workouts "voluntary," but
players know that if they do not participate, they will not secure
good positions on the team and could lose their scholarships.1 30 A
icy which led the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection"')
(quoting Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 518 (Haw. 1970)).
126. Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360, 1372 (3d Cir. 1993)
(quoting Gardner v. Consol. Rail Corp., 573 A.2d 1016, 1020 (Pa. 1990) (quoting
Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 681 (Pa. 1979))). "The statement that there is or is not
a duty, however, 'begs the essential question - whether the plaintiffs interests are
entitled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct.'" Turcotte v. Fell,
502 N.E.2d 964, 967 (N.Y. 1986).
127. See Hekmat, supra note 5, at 641 (noting that analysis of public policy
considerations in negligence cases "represents the best interests of student athletes"). Public policy exceptions are also common when courts analyze express
assumption of risk arguments. See AlexanderJ. Drago, Assumption of Risk: An AgeOld Defense Still Viable in Sports and Recreation Cases, 12 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 583, 587 (2002) (noting releases exculpating defendants from liability are void if they are contrary to public policy). If there is unclear language in
the contract, a disparity in the plaintiff's bargaining power, a violation of a statute,
or language on the back of a ticket that is not signed by the plaintiff and may not
have provided notice, pleas to public policy may defeat an assumption of risk defense. See id. at 587-89 (giving examples of cases where courts have invalidated
assumption of risk defenses in such situations).
128. See Hekmat, supra note 5, at 640 (depicting courts analysis of public policy arguments).
129. See id. (explaining defendant may have heightened duty to curtail risks to
plaintiff if defendant's economic position caused plaintiff to assume defendant
would be curtailing risks). In some jurisdictions, this policy consideration is called
inherent compulsion, and serves as a rebuttal to the assumption of risk defense.
See Meier, supra note 42, at 114 (characterizing possible rebuttal to assumption of
risk defense). For a further discussion of inherent compulsion, see infra notes 162201 and accompanying text.
130. See Hekmat, supra note 5, at 641 (reflecting recent concerns within
NCAA).
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court in this case will not ignore the actual obligation demanded by
the NCAA coach, but instead will recognize an actual duty in that
"voluntary" practice.1 3 1

C.

Assumption of Risk Defense

Defendants assert the assumption of risk affirmative defense
when the plaintiff voluntarily engages in an athletic or recreational
activity involving obvious risks. 132 A plaintiff is deemed to have assumed the risk when the plaintiff "voluntarily assumes a risk of
harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the defendant. ' 1 33 A defendant owes no duty of care to a plaintiff who volun-

tarily participates in a sport with respect to the obvious risks
involved.13 4 With regard to sport negligence cases, Justice Cardozo
'35
said, "the timorous may stay at home.'

To determine whether a plaintiff assumed the risk, courts use a
subjective standard to decide what risks were "known, apparent or
reasonably foreseeable consequences" of the plaintiffs participa131. See id. "[I]t's time we stop shuffling around [the universities'] culpability
for the sake of protecting this cherished notion of football's tough-guy culture.
When that culture turns deadly, we must hold accountable its keepers." Id. (alterations in original).
132. See Drago, supra note 127, at 583 (noting assumption of risk defense applicable in both professional and amateur sports). Drago hypothesized that the
following questions would be asked to ascertain if an assumption of risk doctrine
could be applied in the Stringer wrongful death suit:
As a professional athlete, did the decedent have the requisite knowledge
that his continuing to practice increased the likelihood of injury? Did the
decedent have the ability to remove himself from practice if he felt ill, or
if he believed the weather conditions increased the chance of a medical
emergency? Are severe medical afflictions - and even death - risks that
are inherent in the violent and intense world of professional football?
Were those risks increased by the actions or inactions of the defendants?
Id. at 608.
133. Id. at 583-84 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1977));
see also Meier, supra note 42, at 108 (defining assumption of risk). The Restatement (Second) of Torts Comments to § 496 identify four different definitions of
assumption of risk that have been recognized by courts. See Drago, supranote 127,
at 584 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A, cmt. c (1977)). Comment c(1) defines assumption of risk as when a plaintiff expressly consents to release the defendant of any obligation of care. See id. Comment c(2) defines
assumption of risk as when a plaintiff voluntarily enters into an activity knowing
that it involves some risks, and thereby has implicitly assumed risk. See id. Comment c(3) defines assumption of risk as when a plaintiff, knowing that the defendant has negligently caused a dangerous situation, continues voluntarily to
participate and face that risk. See id. Comment c(4) defines assumption of risk as
when a plaintiff unreasonably, but voluntarily, encounters a risk. See id.
134. See Drago, supra note 127, at 590 (observing outcome when plaintiff has
acted voluntarily).
135. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929)
(describing risk plaintiff took in decision to ride amusement park attraction).
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tion. 13 6 Courts traditionally apply the assumption of risk doctrine
when the plaintiff "reasonably underst [ands] and appreciate [s] the
dangers inherent in the game."'13 7 Some courts recognize that a
plaintiff's appreciation for the risks of a sport will depend upon the
plaintiffs knowledge and experience in that sport.13 8 Specifically,
courts assume that professional athletes understand the risks of
their sport better than their amateur counterparts and accept more
139
risks because they receive a salary.
In addition to the forseeability requirement, the plaintiffs actions must also be voluntary to meet the assumption of risk doctrine. 1 40 "[T]he common law does not assume to protect [the
plaintiff] from the effects of his own personality and from the con14 1
sequences of his voluntary actions or of his careless misconduct."
To determine voluntariness, courts examine the plaintiff's
conduct. 142
Courts use the assumption of risk doctrine inconsistently, and
because of the confusion among the courts, many have suggested
abandoning the doctrine." 4 3 Courts, however, remain reluctant to
136. See Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 967 (N.Y. 1986) (exploring scope of
plaintiff's consent); see also Meier, supra note 42, at 108 (referring to RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A, cmt. d).
137. Lewis, supra note 36, at 285 (discussing that more modern courts have
not as readily applied assumption of risk doctrine when there may be reckless or
intentional conduct on part of defendant). See generally Marchetti v. Kalish, 559
N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ohio 1990) (dismissing plaintiffs negligence claim in game of
"kick the can" because defendant did not act recklessly or intentionally and plaintiff assumed risks by participating in game).
138. See Turcotte, 502 N.E.2d at 968 (deciding how to analyze claim that defendant jockey "foul rided" during horse race and caused plaintiff jockey's injury).
139. See id. (describing analysis of professional athlete's consent to risks in
sport); see also McElhaney v. Monroe, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 366, at *7 (Ohio Ct.
App. Feb. 1, 1989) (explaining foreseeable risks that football participants consent
to include normal risks attendant to bodily contact); Drago, supra note 127, at 593
(portraying presumption that professional athletes are more willing to accept
these risks in exchange for his or her salary).
140. See Meier, supra note 42, at 108 (referencing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 496E(1) which states "plaintiff does not assume a risk of harm unless he
voluntarily accepts the risk").
141. Id. at 107 (citing Francis H. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20
HARv. L. REv. 14, 14 (1906)).
142. See id. at 108 (discussing in late 19th Century, employees were held to
have voluntarily assumed risks inherent in their jobs). "Discontent [with the assumption of risk doctrine] ...emerged [from] 'a growing recognition of the reality of the forces which pretty much coerced a workman to continue in one
employment or another with its various attendant dangers . . . . It was '[the
worker's] poverty, not his will' which consented."' Id.
143. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 699 (Cal. 1992) (describing history of
confusion with assumption of risk doctrine); Meier, supra note 42, at 105-06 (attributing confusion to assumption of risk doctrine's multiple reformulations).
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abandon the assumption of risk doctrine altogether, particularly in
sports-related cases. 144 Instead, many states have passed compara1 45
tive negligence statutes.
In comparative negligence statutes, assumption of risk is no
longer an absolute defense; instead, courts apportion the incurred
risk between the plaintiff and defendant using a factual inquiry. 14 6
Now, the duty of care "owed to [a] plaintiff in [a] professional
plainsporting event ... must be evaluated by considering the risks
14 7
tiff assumed when he elected to participate in the event."'
1.

General Application of the Assumption of Risk Doctrine

The landmark case for modern application of the assumption
of risk doctrine is Knight v.Jewett.148 In that case, the plaintiffs little
finger was amputated after the defendant stepped on her hand during an informal game of "touch" football. 149 The court explained
that traditionally, an assumption of risk analysis would be used to
either define the limits of the defendant's duty or to decide if the
plaintiff "knowingly and voluntarily ...

chose [ ] to encounter the

specific risk of harm posed by the defendant's duty." 150 The court
noted, however, that these varied tort definitions of assumption of
5
risk resulted in confused and varied applications of the doctrine.' '
The court stated that by adopting a comparative fault statute, Cali144. See Meier, supra note 42, at 106 (discussing prevalence of assumption of
risk doctrine). The assumption of risk doctrine may be applied in situations that
are not direct competition, but nonetheless sports related. See Drago, supra note
127, at 608 (noting that "the defense of assumption of risk is only limited by our
ability to devise new ways to entertain ourselves"). Most assumption of risk defenses in sports contexts are implied. See id. at 590 (contrasting express assumption of risk defenses, used when plaintiff has signed contract or has otherwise
expressly agreed to accept risk arising from defendant's negligent conduct).
145. See Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 967 (N.Y. 1986) (noting enactment
of New York's comparative negligence statute); see also King v. Univ. of Indianapolis, NA 01-233-C-B/H, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19070, at *14 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 3, 2002)
(noting Indiana's adoption of comparative negligence statute); Knight, 834 P.2d at
700 (referencing California's adoption of comparative fault statute).
146. See King, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19070, at *14 (describing Indiana's comparative negligence statute).
147. Turcotte, 502 N.E.2d at 967 (describing analysis under comparative negligence concept).
148. 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).
149. See Knight, 834 P.2d at 697-98 (explaining facts of case). At one point
during play, the plaintiff "told defendant 'not to play so rough or [she] was going
to have to stop playing.'" Id. at 697 (testifying to level of play in game).
150. Id. at 699-700 (noting how past assumption of risk cases were largely
decided).
151. See id. at 699 (referring to "leading tort treatises" admission of doctrine's
confusion).
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fornia rejected the absolute defense of the assumption of risk doctrine and instead embraced a system where "the extent of fault
should govern the extent of liability [because this] remains irresistible to reason and all intelligent notions of fairness."' 52
The court disagreed with lower courts that distinguish between
the plaintiff's assumption of risk being "reasonable" or "unreasonable" to decide whether the plaintiff could bring his or her claim
against the defendant. 15 3 Instead, the court instructed that a "primary"/"secondary" assumption of risk distinction be used:
First, in "primary assumption of risk" cases - where the
defendant owes no duty to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk or harm - a plaintiff who has suffered such
harm is not entitled to recover from the defendant,
whether the plaintiff's conduct in undertaking the activity
was reasonable or unreasonable. Second, in "secondary as-

sumption of risk" cases - involving instances where the defendant has breached the duty of care owed to the
plaintiff - the defendant is not entitled to be entirely relieved of liability for an injury proximately caused by such
breach, simply because the plaintiffs conduct in encountering the risk of such an injury was reasonable rather than
unreasonable. Third and finally, the question whether the
defendant owed a legal duty to protect the plaintiff from a
particular risk of harm does not turn on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the plaintiffs conduct, but
rather on the nature of the activity or sport in which the
defendant is engaged and the relationship of the defendant and the plaintiff to that activity or sport. 154

152. Id. at 700 (quoting Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230-31 (Cal.
1975)) (emphasis omitted). Much of the Knight decision redefined the court's
prior holding in Li, that the comparative fault statute subsumed, or merged, the
traditional assumption of risk concept, and did not require courts to first decide if
traditional assumption of risk by the plaintiff barred the use of the comparative
negligence statute. See Knight, 834 P.2d at 701 ("[T]he Li decision clearly contemplated that the assumption of risk doctrine was to be partially merged or subsumed
into the comparative negligence scheme. Subsequent Court of Appeal decisions
have disagreed, however ... as to what category of assumption of risk cases would
be merged .... ") (emphasis and citations omitted).
153. See id. at 704 (acknowledging that although difference between primary/
secondary and reasonable/unreasonable seems semantic, it carries legal
significance).
154. Knight, 834 P.2d at 704 (explaining why "reasonable"/"unreasonable"
distinction "is more misleading than helpful").
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Because the defendant was a mere co-participant of the plaintiff
and did not owe her any duty, the court held that the assumption of
risk was "primary," and therefore, comparative fault principles were
inapplicable. 155 The court upheld summary judgment for the defendant, explaining that while the defendant may have been careless or negligent in his actions, he did not act with intent to

injure.
2.

156

Application of Assumption of Risk in Heat Exhaustion Cases

The relevant case demonstrating the assumption of risk appli15 7
cation in heat exhaustion cases is King v. University of Indianapolis.

In that case, a sophomore college student suffered heat stroke and
158 Before starting
died during the first football practice of the fall.
the practices, King signed a form entitled "Assumption of Risk" in
which he specifically assumed all risks and liability for injuries re159 The
sulting from his participation in the football program.
court, denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment,
held that the expressed assumption of risk contract did not include
the university's possible negligence, and therefore, the plaintiff did
not expressly waive claims resulting from the university's alleged
negligent conduct. 160 The court also disagreed with defendants' argument that by signing the "Assumption of Risk" contract, King
"'manifested consent to voluntarily expose himself to the risk of
1 61 The court said
harm,' thus 'relieving them of a duty' of care."
that King could only consent to assume risks that he possessed an
actual knowledge and appreciation of which excluded "forces other
than those inherent in the game of football, specifically Defendants' negligence in failing to provide for King's safety and protection from potentially dangerous conditions .... "162
155. See id. at 712 (concluding defendant did not breach any duty of care
owed to plaintiff).
156. See id. at 711-12 (denoting intent to injure necessary for defendant's actions to be "so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity
involved in the sport").
157. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19070 (Oct. 3, 2002).
158. See King, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19070, at *3-4 (describing facts of case).
159. See id. at *2-3 (describing factual background).
160. See id. at *13 (explaining that "Assumption of Risk" contract did not sufficiently shift risk of negligence).
161. See id. (quoting defendant's reply brief in support of summary judgment).

162. Id. at *15 (requiring factual questions regarding comparative negligence

be decided by reasonable jury).
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D.

Inherent Compulsion Rebuttal to the Assumption of
Risk Defense
A rebuttal to the assumption of risk doctrine, the theory of inherent compulsion states that an assumption of risk does not shield
liability when the compulsion of a superior overcomes the plaintiffs voluntariness in a situation. 16 3 Two elements demonstrate that
an inherent compulsion existed. 1 64 First, the superior or coach directed the player to act. 165 Second, an economic compulsion or
other circumstance existed that would compel the player to act accordingly. 166 Currently, New York is one of the only jurisdictions to
recognize inherent compulsion, although plaintiffs have asserted it
16 7
in other states.
1.

GeneralApplication of the Inherent Compulsion Doctrine

New York introduced and interpreted the inherent compulsion theory in Benitez v. New York City Board of Education.'68 There,
the plaintiff, the star of a football team, was injured as a result of
playing against superior competition. 69 The plaintiff argued that
the defendant negligently allowed the unreasonable "mismatch"
and additionally allowed the plaintiff to play the entire game, making him tired and susceptible to injury. 170 The New York Supreme
163. See Meier, supra note 42, at 114 (characterizing possible rebuttal to assumption of risk defense).
164. See id. (listing factors courts consider when analyzing inherent
compulsion).
165. See id. (depicting first criteria for inherent compulsion).
166. See id. (depicting second criteria for inherent compulsion).
167. See Benitez v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 541 N.E.2d 29, 33 (N.Y. 1989) (defining inherent compulsion theory); see also Vecchione v. Middle Country Cent.
Sch. Dist., 752 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (holding no inherent compulsion in student-plaintiffs fall on wet tennis court); Salvieterra v. Havekotte, 709
N.Y.S.2d 120, 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (affirming jury finding that housekeeper
under inherent compulsion when injured); Dobski v. City of Schenectady, 706
N.Y.S.2d 777, 778-79 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (ordering new trial when lower court
did not provide inherent compulsion jury instruction, yet overturned jury verdict
on inherent compulsion grounds); Weber v. William Floyd Sch. Dist., 707 N.Y.S.2d
231, 232 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (noting no application of inherent compulsion
theory); Picardo v. N. Patchogue Medford Youth Athletic Assoc., Inc., 569 N.Y.S.2d
186, 186 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (finding insufficient evidence for inherent compulsion to negate assumption of risk); Meier, supra note 42, at 114 (noting although
unsuccessful, plaintiffs have pursued inherent compulsion theory in states other
than New York).
168. See Benitez, 541 N.E.2d at 33 (explaining inherent compulsion theory).
169. See id. at 30-31 (illustrating facts of case).
170. See id. at 31 (reciting plaintiffs allegations that defendant was negligent
for "allowing GW to play the JFK game in the face of an obvious mismatch; and
allowing him to play virtually the entire first half of the game without adequate
rest").
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Court agreed with the plaintiff, finding that the defendant unreasonably enhanced the chance of injury by allowing the "mismatch"
to occur. 17 1 Moreover, the court held that the plaintiff participated

in the game because of an inherent compulsion: the plaintiff
wanted a college scholarship that the coach had influence over, and
the plaintiff knew that the coach wanted him to play against the
more skilled competition. 172 The dissent, however, argued that the
and knew that fatigue
plaintiff played entire football games before
1 73
football.
playing
in
was an inherent risk
On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, the court agreed
1 7 4 The court conwith the dissent and reversed the judgment.
firmed that the inherent compulsion theory could be used when
"the element of voluntariness is overcome by the compulsion of a
superior. 1 75 In this particular case, however, the court found an
insufficient showing that the plaintiffs potential scholarship made
him feel as if he had to play despite his concern that the teams were
176
mismatched.
Although not specifically labeled as inherent compulsion,
Ohio courts recently discussed similar legal concepts as applied to
7 7 There,
employees in Snider v. Clermont Central Soccer Association.
the plaintiff, a referee, was injured during a game in inclement
weather before which he was told by the defendant "to go on that
day no matter what."'1 78 The Ohio court recognized that it was unrealistic to hold that employees' decisions to encounter or avoid
risks are voluntary. 179 Under the assumption of risk doctrine, however, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim, finding that the defendant could not force the plaintiff to continue the game in
171. See id. at 32 (describing rationale in lower court's affirmation of jury
decision).
172. See id. (describing holding of appellate division); see also Drago, supra
note 127, at 602 (articulating inherent compulsion aspect of case).
173. See Benitez, 541 N.E.2d at 32 (summarizing dissent's view in lower court).
174. See id. (reversing holding and dismissing complaint).
175. See id. at 33 (defining inherent compulsion).
176. See id. at 34 ("In sum, plaintiff Benitez failed to present any evidence that
he had no choice but to follow the coach's direction to play despite his concern
over enhanced risk factors known by or communicated to the coach."). The court
went on to state that "[f]atigue ... [is] inherent in ... football" and that the case

"was a luckless accident arising from the vigorous voluntary participation in competitive . . . athletics." Id.

177. No. CA98-07-056, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1126, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
Mar. 22, 1999).
178. See Snider, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1126, at *2 (describing facts of case).
179. See id. at *11 (describing holding in Cremeans v. Willmat Henderson
Mfg. Co., 566 N.E.2d 1203 (Ohio 1991) as described in Syler v. Signode Corp., 601
N.E.2d 225, 228 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)).
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dangerous conditions. 180 To support the decision that the referee
acted voluntarily, the court pointed to evidence showing that the
defendant paid the plaintiff only eight dollars an hour, and that the
plaintiff actually relied on a full-time job as his livelihood. 181
2.

Possible Applications in "FootballCulture" Cases

To introduce her reflections on the relationship between the
law and culture, Associate Professor of Law Naomi Mezey recently
wrote that "[t] he notion of culture is everywhere invoked and virtually nowhere explained."' 8 2 She included within the latter assertion
that culture is nowhere explained within the area of law. 183 The
few cases presented here, whose facts give rise to issues about the
culture of football, have unfortunately not been resolved under a
negligence analysis, but have been resolved on other grounds.' 8 4
In resolving such cases on other grounds, the courts have successfully avoided answering if a defendant has a duty to maintain an
appropriate "culture," or if inherent compulsion is just a legal term
signaling an improper "culture."1 8 5
In Ellis v. Rocky Mountain Empire Sports, Inc.,' 86 the plaintiff, a
NFL first round draft pick for the Denver Broncos, alleged that the
team negligently required him to engage in contact football drills
before he had fully recovered from an off-season knee injury, resulting in further injury to his knee.18 7 The court first held that Ellis
had to arbitrate the case under the standard player contract that he
signed with the NFL member team.18 8 The court then added that
180. See id. at *12 (denying that defendant could control plaintiff's actions).
181. See id. (noting "the economic necessity of undertaking dangerous risky
tasks imposed upon employees is not similarly imposed upon independent contractors") (quoting Maher v. Scollard, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 502, *7 (Ohio Ct.
App. Jan. 29, 1993)).
182. Naomi Mezey, Approaches to the Cultural Study of Law: Law as Culture, 13

YALEJ.L. & HuMAN. 35, 35 (2001) (explaining that "[c]ulture can mean so many

things").
183. See id. at 35-36 (asserting it is wrong that cultural acts are frequently held
to have no legal significance and legal acts are frequently held to have no cultural
significance).
184. For examples of the legal rationale that avoids answering cultural questions, see infra notes 186-201 and accompanying text.
185. For examples of the legal rationale that avoids answering cultural questions, see infra notes 186-201 and accompanying text.
186. 602 P.2d 895 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979).
187. See Ellis, 602 P.2d at 896 (describing facts and allegations of complaint).
For further discussion of NFL players being pressured to play with injury, see infra
notes 226-37 and accompanying text.
188. See Ellis, 602 P.2d 896-97 (denying argument that arbitration clause
unconscionable).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol12/iss1/3

26

Charnley: Is the Football Culture out of Bounds - Finding Liability for Kor
2005]

LIABILIY

FOR KoREY STRINGER'S DEATH

189 In reworkers' compensation provided Ellis's only remedy.
sponse, Ellis tried to argue that he was exempt from the exclusivity
clause of workers' compensation because his claim encompassed
190
the intentional tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The court responded that because the alleged intentional tort
stemmed from co-employees hitting him in practice and not from
an act by the Broncos organization itself, Ellis did not avoid the
191 Ellis failed to show
workers' compensation's exclusivity clause.
that the Broncos' action of putting him back into practice before
192 Because the
his knee had healed constituted an intentional tort.
court barred Ellis from his tort action, he could not argue that the
Broncos were negligent in pressuring him to return to practice after an injury, a problem commonly cited within the culture of
93
football.'
As previously discussed, a high school student was rendered
paraplegic after weights fell on him during a football tryout in Vargo
v. Svitchan.1 9 4 There, the court held that state immunity did not
protect the school principal from liability because he was responsi-

ble for minimizing "overexertion and resultant injuries ...

foresee-

95
able and frequent in the absence of proper supervision."
Similarly, state immunity did not protect the athletic director because he was responsible "to oversee the practices," "promulgate[ ]
reasonable safety precautions," and "minimize[ ] injury to the students."1 9 6 This holding signals that the Michigan court holds third
parties beyond just the coaching staff responsible for the culture of a
those parties have some level
high school football program1 9where
7
program.
the
over
control
of
The Michigan court did not speculate as to what part of the
football program the principal and athletic director may have negli-

189. See id. at 898 (confirming exclusivity of workers' compensation laws).
For more on workers' compensation exclusivity, see supranotes 32-38 and accompanying text.
190. See Ellis, 602 P.2d at 898 (rejecting Ellis's attempt to avoid workers' com-

pensation statutes).

191. See id. (holding Ellis had no right to negligence claim).

192. See id. Ellis did not include the NFL as a defendant in this suit, and if he

subsequently tried to sue the NFL for his injury, the case is not recorded. See id.

193. For more discussion about the pressure on football players to play in-

jured, see infra notes 226-37 and accompanying text.

194. Vargo v. Svithchan, 301 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (describing
facts).
195. Id. at 5 (denying principal-defendant immunity and remanding case to
decide principal's negligence).
196. Id. at 5 (remanding case to decide if athletic director negligent).

197. See id. (describing roles of principal and athletic director).
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gently supervised and controlled. 19 8 The court specifically noted,
however, that the injury occurred during football tryouts and that
the plaintiff alleged that the principal and athletic director "allowed [the coach] to abuse students and to threaten and pressure
them into attempting athletic feats beyond their capabilities," even
after the principal allegedly "receiv[ed] a complaint and notice that
[the coach] was 'too rough' on his prospective football players."' 19 9
Because the plaintiff was trying out for the team, a New York
court might have applied an inherent compulsion theory. 200 First,
the superior directive would be that the coach directed participation in a weight lifting session as part of the tryout, which implicitly
meant lifting as much weight as possible. 2 0' Second, it would be
argued that scholarships and the chance to play professional football at least partly economically motivates high-school boys, albeit
202
indirectly.
IV.

ANALYSIS

Legal analysts believe that Ms. Stringer's negligence lawsuit
against the NFL will be difficult, but not impossible, to win. 20 3 The
allegation that the NFL condones a "deadly culture" is the most
challenging claim in the multi-layered lawsuit. 204 This difficulty exists because definitions and perceptions of "culture," or any subset
198. See id. (describing general roles of principal and athletic director).
199. Vargo, 301 N.W.2d at 3-5 (describing facts).
200. For a discussion of inherent compulsion, see supra notes 163-81 and accompanying text.
201. For a discussion of the first element of the inherent compulsion theory,
see supra note 165 and accompanying text.
202. For a discussion of the second element for the inherent compulsion theory, see supra note 166 and accompanying text.
203. The latest Stringer lawsuit against the NFL "will be an uphill battle," but
is not impossible, according to Eldon Ham, adjunct professor of sports law at Chicago-Kent College of Law. Mike Freeman, Widow Plans to Intensify Her Battle With
the NF.L., N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2003, § 8, at 5 [hereinafter Plans to Intensify]. Because a Minnesota Court has dismissed the Vikings suit, and because Stringer is the
only heat-related death in the NFL's history, it will "be very difficult to show how
the NFL is liable" according to Jeffrey Rosenthal, chair of the NY bar association's
Entertainment Arts and Sports Law section. Bob Velin, Widow sues NFLfor death of
Stringer, USA TODAY.COM, at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/200307-29-stringer-suitIx.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2004) (explaining that Rosenthal believes Stringer will have to show that NFL created knowingly dangerous situation
that led to Stringer's death).
204. The suit alleges that the "National Football League training camps are
modern-day sweat shops" and training camp conditions "not only are condoned
and perpetuated by the National Football League, but also ingrained in its culture,
a perverse and deadly culture that the League tolerates, fosters, and even markets."
Complaint, supra note 11, at 2-3.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol12/iss1/3

28

Charnley: Is the Football Culture out of Bounds - Finding Liability for Kor
2005]

LIABILITY FOR

KoREv

STRINGER'S DEATH

of culture, varies vastly depending on individual understandings of
the concept.

20 5

A.

The Culture Debate

ESPN recently highlighted the NFL's culture in a television series entitled Playmakers, which averaged 2.2 million viewers each
week. 20 6 Among many other scenarios, Playmakers depicted one
football player addicted to crack, another arrested for assaulting his
20 7 The
wife, and yet another pressured into playing with an injury.

20 8
On FebruNFL successfully pressured ESPN to cancel the show.

their hit show in order to keep the NFL
ary 5, 2004, ESPN cancelled
20 9
as a business partner.

The ESPN television series is not the only one questioning the
NFL's culture. Kelci Stringer alleges that the NFL has a "perverse,
insidious and deadly culture . . .which unreasonably subjects play-

ers to heat-related illness during practices." 210 While it is unclear if
the court will view this claim as a duty of care argument or a public
policy argument, it is clear that at the heart of this claim is the culture of football, the source of significant current debate.
1. Elite Sport Needs Athletes to Give 110%
Traditionalists, loyal to the game of football, say that more
than any other sport, football players must consistently test their
limits. 2 11 They argue that athletes must "maintain the absolute

205. See Mezey, supra note 182, at 39-40 (asserting culture is complex
concept).
206. Joe Flint, ESPN's Risky New Game Plan: Relying Less on Pro Sports, WALL ST.

J., Oct. 24, 2003, at Al, All.
207. See id. (describing show).
208. See id. Pat Bowlen, who negotiates NFL television contracts, said the
show was "horrible" and that "he [couldn't] understand why ESPN, which has profited from its relationship with pro football, would 'go out and crap all over the
product."' Id. at Al. Although it seems that ESPN might be taking a cue from the
realities of professional football, the creator of Playmakers,John Eisendrath, denied
this, saying that he is creating fiction. Mark Shapiro, ESPN's programming chief,
claims "[ESPN's] fans don't think that 'Playmakers' is the NFL anymore than they
think 'The West Wing' is George Bush's White House." Id. at All.
209. See Connor Ennis, ESPA

Cancels 'Playmakers', at http://www.detnews.

7
com/2004/lions/0402/05/lions-5596 .htm (Feb. 5, 2004) (noting NFL is "a longtime - and lucrative - partner" to ESPN). Mark Shapiro, ESPN's programming
chief, said about the cancellation that "[t]o go ahead with a second season ...
would be rubbing it in the faces of our most important client." Id.
210. Unusual Woman, supra note 3, at D2 (describing key argument in
complaint).
211. See Meier, supra note 42, at 144 (arguing football players pushing physical limitations is part of embraced attitude in America).
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peak physical condition that they believe necessary [ ] to brilliantly
excel at a job .... -212 The common sentiment among traditionalists is that although there is a high level of physical rigor, professional football players accept pain and the high risk of injury for
21 3
financial rewards.
Modern society celebrates football coaches who use extreme
behavior to train athletes and win football championships. 2 14 Winning coaches who have the ability to motivate athletes to perform at
their peak potential are greatly admired and compensated, despite
using coaching techniques that could be deemed wanton or grossly
negligent by legal standards.2 1 5 Bear Bryant, generally regarded as
one of the greatest college football coaches of all time, had seventysix of his one hundred players quit because of harsh practice conditions, including Bryant kicking a player after he collapsed due to
heat exhaustion. 2 16 Vince Lombardi, also generally regarded as
one of the greatest NFL coaches of all time, put his players through
"'ungodly' conditioning workouts," driving players to the point
that
they collapsed from heat exhaustion. 2 17
212. See Kreidler, supra note 3 ("[A)s much as it would comfort some people
to be able to find someone or something to blame for Stringer's death, the truth
may prove far too elusive for that kind of formula. It just isn't that simple. Elite
athletes push ....").
213. See Meier, supra note 42, at 154 (asserting Stringer "took on risks, but
surely the bargain reflected in the $18.4 million contract extension and the $4
million signing bonus that he received.. . includ[ing] some compensation for...
tak[ing] those risks").
The reality, however, is that while some make millions, over half of all NFL
players earn less than $500,000 a year. See Randall, supra note 3 (emphasizing that
because football players cause such damages to their bodies, their careers are
much shorter than normal careers). Stringer's attorney has commented on the
NFL culture: "Frankly, it's no coincidence that the average football player in the
NFL plays for four and a half years. They use them up and spit them out." Freed,
supra note 3. Furthermore, even if a NFL salary compensates for the risk of injury
that occurs from direct hits during games, some do not believe the exchange of
money for risk acceptance ever includes acceptance of death at a practice. See
Patrick, supra note 2 (noting that "Stringer was only practicing .... He wasn't

preparing for the Super Bowl .... [D]ying from heat stroke in training camp

wasn't part of the deal").
214. See Hurst & Knight, supra note 32, at 29 (characterizing America's perception of football).
215. See id. at 28 (noting that Bear Bryant and Vince Lombardi are considered
two of greatest football coaches ever, and are admired despite their legendary
harsh coaching).
216. See id. at 28-29. Bear Bryant's legendary training camp is chronicled in
the book THE JUNCTION Boys, which describes water breaks needing to be earned,
and players throwing up all over the place. See generally Patrick, supra note 2 (questioning football camp training conditions).
217. See Hurst & Knight, supra note 32, at 29; see also Hekmat, supranote 5, at
613 (quoting Vince Lombardi as saying "[f]atigue makes cowards of us all"). But
see, e.g., Kristina Rico, Note, Excessive Exercise as Corporal Punishment in Moore v.
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Furthermore, some academics who study the intersection of
sports and society assert that football reflects the American value
system. 2 18 Achievement through hard work and perseverance underpins the "Spirit of Capitalism" and the very foundation of
America's prominence. 2 19 Sports in early American history were regarded as "character-building activities" that instilled in athletes the
same work ethic needed in the labor force to "continually raise the
level of our achievement."' 220 Sports also put the "American
Dream" on display, showing that "successful performance results in
social mobility" and instilled discipline, which led to greater
achievements in education. 2 21 Of all the sports in America, football
22 2
is believed to best promote these lessons and culture.
2.

Elite Sport at What Cost?

Other critics believe that this expectation for football players to
push past physical limitations goes too far. Athletes are expected to
display "superhuman-hero" feats, and play "hurt, sick or fatigued." 22 3 There is a stigma that if athletes do not give 110%, NFL
players lose their positions on the team. 22 4 This stigma blurs the
Willis Independent School District - Has the Fifth Circuit "Totally Isolated" Itself in its
Position, 9 Viu_. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 351, 386 (2002) (noting Lombardi's sentiment
that "winning is not everything.., it's the only thing" hurts athlete-coach relationship). "Coaches must resist the forces of society and the media encouraging them
to win at all costs, while becoming clearer about their coaching objectives." Id. at
386 n.225.
218. See Meier, supra note 42, at 145 (finding football holds important role in
American society).
219. See id. at 144 (proposing football strengthens capitalism).
220. See id. at 148 (quoting BERO RIGAUER, SPORT AND WORK 27 (Allen Guttman trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1981) (1969)).
221. See id. at 149 (articulating football's contributions to America's development).
222. See id. at 150-53 (dismissing harshest critics of football because they are
also critics of American values reflected in football: "achievement, competition,
duty to a calling, and capitalism").
223. Rico, supra note 217, at 351 (contrasting excessive force commonly used
to coach today's athletes with limited, reasonable force teachers are allowed to use
when disciplining students). See generally Richard E. Lapchick, Dying for the Game,
NE. U. CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF SPORT IN Soc'Y, at http://www.sportinsociety.org/
rel-article22.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2004) (noting athletes ignore risks involved
in sports).
224. See Rico, supra note 217, at 385 n.221 ("[T]he game, whatever sport it
may be, 'is no longer in its purest form and won't be again - until athletes stop
abusing their bodies to avoid losing their status on the team, hurting their ego, or
quite possibly, losing theirjob."') (quoting Edmond Ball, Hot and Bothered: Are Today's Athletes Pushing Themselves Too Much, MEDIA CHALLENGE HOT CORNER, at
http://www.mediachallenge.com/hotcorner/ (Aug. 31, 2001)).
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line of what are "voluntary" assumptions of risk. 225 The prospect

that athletes may lose theirjobs if they do not give 110% casts doubt
on whether football players actually "voluntarily" assume the risks
they take in expending this extra, and sometimes dangerous,
effort.

22 6

Because team cohesion leads to more wins, coaches strive to
create a collective team identity by promoting interdependence
among players. 227 The message is that all players must sacrifice
their personal desires and overcome their reservations to achieve
the goal of the team. 228 The resulting team-oriented mentality

leads the individual players to push beyond personal limits, perhaps
leading them to participate in dangerous and risky activities they
would not otherwise accept. 229

Teammates also motivate each

other during practices to push harder, in spite of visible signs of
23 0
exertion or failing health.
This "distorted team concept," however, has many negative
consequences. First, players are disciplined if they speak out
against fellow teammates or the culture of the team. 23 1 Following

Stringer's death, NFL players discussed their reluctance to freely
225. See Lemons, supra note 5, at 12 (proposing football's culture has diluted
voluntariness of participation). For example, although the NCAA forbids off-season practices, all college football players know that off-season "voluntary" practices
are important "boot camps" and not attending is highly detrimental to securing a
staring position. These practices are very dangerous, as no medical supervision is
present, or else it would be considered a sanctioned practice. See id. College football programs see "voluntary" off-season practices as necessary to obtain the larger
goal: making money. Big money is made through ticket sales (Notre Dame takes
in $3 million per home game on tickets alone), television contracts, and most importantly, bowl games (ABC pays $71 million to televise the Bowl Championship
Series ("BCS")). See id. at 12 n.12.
226. Id. at 12.
227. See Hekmat, supra note 5, at 639 (analyzing football culture).
228. See id. (asserting team pressure present in football).
229. See id. at 638-39 (illustrating progression to players pushing past personal
limitations). But see Kreidler, supra note 3 (finding group mentality helps athletes
as "[e]lite athletes push ... others as well as themselves").
230. See Hekmat, supra note 5, at 639 (describing importance of teammates in
football). When Wheeler, the Northwestern safety who died after an asthma attack
during practice in the summer of 2001, was struggling during practice, "teammates
yelled, 'Let's go ....Come on! Keep moving!"' A teammate of Devaughn Darling,
the Florida State football player who died during football practice, said that Darling "never quit... [a]nd no matter what comes in my life, I won't quit until I pass
out like he did. He gave it everything he had. What a way to go." Id.
231. See Selena Roberts, The Code of Silence Corrupts the Young, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
28, 2003, § 8, at 9 [hereinafter Code of Silence] (reporting in recent Mepham High
School hazing case, no high school football players would discuss older teammates
allegedly sodomizing three j.v. players with broomsticks, golf balls, and pine cones
for fear of repercussions). Lawyers have found few players willing to be witnesses
in the Korey Stringer case. See id.
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dissent on workplace conditions. 23 2 One of the few players to comment on Stringer's death, New York Giants' Lomas Brown said,
"[y]ou don't want to show the coaches you're slowing down ....
It's your macho mentality - only the strongest survive. ' 233 Seattle
Seahawks' Ricky Watters also admitted "[i] t's like, 'I can't afford to
23 4
be sick.' ,,
From the NFL's annual Rookie Symposium, to day-today practices with NFL coaches, the players are "conditioned to refrain from free expression in the workplace often to the detriment
of their own health, safety, and lives. ' 235 The Cincinnati Bengals
recently turned this credo into contract, demanding that their
player contracts include an addendum that "would allow the team
to take away all or part of a player's signing bonus if he publicly
23 6
criticizes team officials, coaches, or teammates."
Second, because professional athletes do not want to lose their
teammates' respect, they play with pain, and pressure team doctors
to clear them in order to play. 237 Professional team doctors succumb to pressure under this "win at all costs" mentality and often
make medical decisions that jeopardize players' health to appease
238
the coach.
Third, players put their health at risk by gaining weight to meet
NFL expectations frequently included in player contracts. 2 39 NFL
linemen now weigh more than ever in the NFL's history, and many
players meet the medical standards of obesity. 240 Along with a
higher weight comes a higher risk for these players to have heat232. See Thomas E. Fielder, Keep Your Mouth Shut and Listen: The NFL Player's
Right of Free Expression, 10 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 547, 549 (2002).
233. Id. (quoting from Jon Saraceno, Stringer's Death Raises Tough Issues, USA
TODAY, Aug. 2, 2001, at 3C).

234. George, supra note 4, at D4.
235. Fielder, supra note 232, at 549 (citing NFL superior at Rookie Symposium told rookies to "[k]eep your mouth shut and listen").
236. Id. at 549-50 (detailing Cincinnati Bengals player contract).
237. SeeJustin P. Caldarone, Professional Team Doctors: Money, Prestige, and Ethical Dilemmas, 9 SPORTS LAw. J. 131, 133 (2002) (discussing ethical dilemmas faced
by athletic trainers and medical staff). Brett Favre, quarterback of the Green Bay
Packers, played his 2003 football season with a broken thumb, saying "I always
figured if the bone wasn't sticking out of the skin, you could play... [as] [t]hat's
what they made tape for." Rob Reischel, Thumbs up: Favrefinds way to play, at http:/
/www.jsonline.com/packer/News/oct03/180960.asp (Oct. 29, 2003).
238. See Caldarone, supra note 237, at 151 (questioning if Stringer's death
could have been prevented, although "one would like to think that the coaches,
trainers, and team doctors did not notice the warning signs until it was too late
.... [but] [t]hat ... is unlikely").
239. See Culture of Obesity, supra note 82, § 8, at 5 (noting that Stringer's contract demanded he maintain his weight at 335 pounds).
240. See id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005

33

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 3
86

VILLANOVA SPORTS

& ENT.

LAW JOuRNAL

[Vol. 12: p. 53

related illnesses because as weight increases, so does the tendency
24
to retain heat. '

Although it is difficult to ascertain the nexus points between
law and culture, the next Section explores the various intersections
between the football culture debate and negligence law that may
2
provide successful arguments in the Stringer case.

B.

42

Potential Traditional Legal Arguments

To establish that the NFL acted negligently, Ms. Stringer will
need to show: first, that the NFL owed a duty to her husband; second, that the NFL breached this duty by condoning a culture that
contributes to heat exhaustion injury; third, that this breach of duty
actually and proximately caused Stringer's heat exhaustion; and
fourth, that Stringer experienced an injury, or, as is in this case,
death.

1.

243

The NFL's Duty of Care

Addressing the NFL's duty owed to Stringer, Ms. Stringer's
complaint against the NFL asserts that "[t]he NFL undertakes the
overall regulation of the League and its member teams, including
scheduling, uniforms, and player health, and generally controls and

oversees the game," and "had and has the duty to use ordinary care
in overseeing, controlling, and regulating the member clubs' practices, policies, procedures, equipment, working conditions, and culture, insofar as they pertain to and subject players to heat-related
illness .... ",244 To prove that the NFL owed a duty of care to Korey
Stringer, Kelci Stringer should argue that the NFL had a special
relationship to her husband, that the NFL could foresee her husband's death, and that the NFL increased the inherent risks associated with the game of football.
241. See Patrick, supra note 2 (recalling Indianapolis Colts general manager
Bill Polian has said he doesn't even consider offensive linemen in recent years if
they weigh less than 300 pounds); see also George, supra note 4, at D4 (quoting
Georgia-based doctor that "when a large body is insulated by fat and [his] uniform
may be soaked so that the sweat doesn't evaporate, it makes [getting rid of body
heat] more difficult").
242. See generally Mezey, supra note 182 (describing intersections of culture
and law).
243. For discussion of elements in negligence cases, see supra notes 42-49 and
accompanying text.
244. Complaint, supra note 11, at 12, 30.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol12/iss1/3

34

Charnley: Is the Football Culture out of Bounds - Finding Liability for Kor
2005]

a.

LLBILITY FOR KOREY STRINGER'S DEATH

Special Relationship

First, unlike the suit against the Vikings, which stumbled because the law limited recovery from an employer, the NFL is not an
employer under the new lawsuit; it is instead a third party that sets
the procedures and regulations for mandatory team training camps
as well as all aspects of professional football. 245 In Kleinknecht, the
Third Circuit held that organizations that decide the rules and
equipment used in a sporting event owe reasonable care to athletes
who participate in that event. 246 The court in Gehling, however,
held the school had no duty because it neither controlled nor
monitored the "fun run." 24 7 In contrast, among other rules and

regulations, the NFL decides what equipment is used in practices
and games, sets fines for untucked shirts, slouched socks, and public criticism of referees, and publishes "best practice guides" for all
teams to follow. 248 There is sufficient evidence for a reasonable
245. See Freed, supra note 3.
246. For a discussion of factors impacting duty of care, see supra notes 55-80
and accompanying text.
247. SeeGehlingv. St. George's Univ. Sch. of Med., Ltd., 705 F. Supp. 761, 766
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (explaining court's rationale).
248. See Press Release, supra note 14. In response to the events of September
11, 2001, the NFL Commissioner immediately formed a task force to deal with
security questions. See Panel I: Legal Issues in Sports Security, 13 FoRDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 349, 352 (2003) [hereinafter Panel 1].The task force
published a set of best practices for security, referred to as a Best Practices Guide,
distributing it to stadium managers and owners to implement. See id. Milton
Ahlerich, the vice president of security for the National Football League, referred
to the players in the NFL as "our most important human resource," and probably
the main motivation for the post-September 11th Best Practices Guide. See id. He
continued that the NFL was "looking after them and being sure that we are doing
everything that we can to protect them" in light of terror concerns. See id. at 351.
If the NFL put out a Best Practice Guide to ensure safety, and have resources including a security vice-president, a medical advisor, and a Safety and Injury Panel
at all, there will be difficulty maintaining that there is no duty of care surrounding
heat illness.
Ahlerich believes, however, that it is a common misconception that the NFL is
a "hierarchical organization" and that the member clubs always follow the suggested policies. Id. at 353. "In actuality, [the Commissioner] has limited authority
.... He can urge, he can write some policies, and if all the owners sign onto it,
things can get done." Id.
The room for member club dissidence, however, is questionable. When the
Baltimore Ravens' coach recently criticized the NFL referees' use of instant replay,
the NFL fined him $15,000. If the NFL can economically punish member teams
that simply criticize their policies, it is unlikely that member clubs stray from NFL
policies. See Ravens hurt twice by questionable reviews, at http://sports.espn.go.com/
espn/print?id=1647482&type=story (Oct. 26, 2003) (describing Ravens coach,
Brian Billick, looking upwards and saying, "League, I'm sorry. I've tried to [hold]
the company line .... ."); see also Len Pasquarelli, Ravens' Coach vented after Bengals
loss, at http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?columnist=pasquarelli-len&
id=1651158# (Oct. 31, 2003) (noting NFL fined Billick for his continued public
criticism).
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jury to find that the NFL makes most decisions surrounding professional football practices and games, and therefore, the NFL owes
2
the players a duty of care.

49

Second, in Kleinknecht, the school's persistent recruiting of the
plaintiff to play lacrosse at their school strengthened the evidence
of a special relationship. 250 The NFL similarly scouts and offers various incentives to players, indicating a special relationship between
2
the two parties.

51

Third, although the state immunity statutes that largely decide
heat exhaustion cases in public schools do not apply to the Stringer
case, the Vargo analysis provides guidance on the role of supervisors.2 5 2 Like the principal and athletic director in Vargo, the NFL is

also a supervisor of football coaches, and the court may expect the

NFL to oversee the football programs coaches implement as well. 2 53

Just as the principal and athletic director were found to oversee and
control the culture of a football program in Vargo, the court here
may hold the NFL responsible to oversee and control the culture of
the professional football program that carries its name, and may
translate that relationship into a broader duty owed to the
players.

b.

254

Foreseeability

First, in Kleinknecht, the court found the plaintiffs heart arrhythmia to be within a general class of foreseeable events. 25 5
Heart arrhythmia, however, can happen at almost any time, while
heat exhaustion will only happen in high humidity. 256 Under this

analysis, occurrences of heat exhaustion are more foreseeable.
In addition, heat exhaustion injuries are now more foreseeable
than in previous years because modern NFL players, particularly
249. For a discussion on the NFL's duty of care, see supra notes 245-48 and
accompanying text.
250. See Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360, 1366-69 (3d Cir.
1993). But see Meier, supra note 42, at 104 (arguing that Kleinknecht holding turned
on inaccessibility to telephone, which should have been for jury to decide).
251. For a discussion of incentives given to football players, see supra note 213
and accompanying text.
252. See Vargo v. Svithchan, 301 N.W.2d 1, 5-8 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (discuss-

ing rationale of case).
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1372.
256. For a discussion on how to prevent heat exhaustion, see supra notes 8191 and accompanying text.
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linemen like Stringer, must maintain obese weight

levels.

257

The

large amount of weight that football players carry increases the
their bodies insulate
foreseeable risk of heat exhaustion because
258
more heat than an average-sized person.
Third, the early Landress decision, previously discussed, helps
another foreseeability argument. 259 Although the Landress decision
has since been overruled, Judge Cardozo's dissent argued that sunstroke is just a common accident and recognized no duty for plaintiffs to stay out of the sun. 260

Cardozo's argument, therefore,

results in no duty assignment to anyone in heat exhaustion injuries.
Ms. Stringer could distinguish her case by arguing that while the
golfer in Landress voluntarily played golf under hot sun, the NFL set
the foreseeStringer's humid, sunny practice, and thus, controlled
26 1
able result of sunstroke and further injuries.
c.

Increase to Inherent Risks

The NFL potentially increased the inherent risks present in
football in several ways. First, as previously discussed, the obesity of
players results in increased chances of suffering from heat exhaustion. 262 Unlike the court's statement in Gehling, faulting the plain-

tiff for weighing too much to safely finish the run, NFL team
contracts, and not the players themselves, now control players'
263
weight gains that ultimately contribute to heat exhaustion injury.
Second, extreme heat unnecessarily increases risks inherent to the
game of football, even though alternatives abound: covered practice facilities, early morning/late day practices, and "black-flag"
64
Third, by not updating medical procedures mandating imdays. 2
257. For a discussion on the obesity of today's professional football players,
see supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
258. For a discussion on the increased risks of heat exhaustion facing obese
persons, see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
259. See Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 495-97 (1934)
(explaining majority's rationale).
260. See id. at 498-99 (dissenting).

261. See id. at 494-95 (stating facts of case).
262. For a discussion on the increased risks of heat exhaustion facing obese
persons, see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
263. See Gehling v. St. George's Univ. Sch. of Med., Ltd., 705 F. Supp. 761, 766
(E.D.N.Y. 1989).
264. See Press Release, supra note 14 (listing alternatives to avoid heat exhaustion). "Black-flag" days refer to days in which the military limits physical activities
to prevent "heat stress problems." See Edwards Air Force Base Guide - 95th Medical Group, Heat Stress Information, at http://www.edwards.af.mil/95med-group/
docshtml/AMDS/Bioenvironmental/heatstress.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2004)
(giving table of flag stages). For other alternatives the NFL could explore, see infra
notes 302-307 and accompanying text.
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mediate proper care, the NFL failed to address the progressive nature of heat exhaustion recognized in Mogabgab.2 65
2.

Stringer's Assumption of Risk

The NFL will likely rebut Ms. Stringer's complaint by asserting
an affirmative defense: the assumption of risk doctrine. To successfully support this assertion, the NFL should argue that Stringer had
knowledge of the risks involved with football, and yet, he voluntarily
assumed those risks anyway.

a.

Knowledge of Inherent Risks

The NFL will assert that because Stringer was an adult professional athlete, and had been playing football all his life, he understood any increased strains that result from practicing in the
heat.2 66 Courts assume professional athletes have a greater under-

standing of risks inherent to their sport because of their
2 67
experience.
With regard to the risks related to the culture of football, the
NFL will likely assert that Stringer and other football players choose
to push themselves, not because they need to meet some intangible
standard set by the NFL, but to achieve their own goals. 268 The

NFL may also point to players' salaries and insist players choose to
contract for multimillions in exchange for playing a physically demanding sport with inherent risks. 269
Kelci Stringer can rebut this assumption of risk defense by arguing that when her husband assumed the risks associated with
football, he assumed only direct injuries associated from football
games, not indirect injuries from practice conditions and a "deadly
culture." 270 The lower court in Benitez, quoting a common Latin
aphorism, held that "[the player] who takes part in such a sport
accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as they are obvious and
265. See Mogabgab v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 239 So. 2d 456, 460 (La. Ct.
App. 1970). For a discussion of Stringer's wait before arriving at the hospital, see
supra note 25 and accompanying text.
266. For a discussion on how courts view the experience of professional athletes, see supra notes 66, 139 and accompanying text.
267. For a discussion on how courts view the experience of professional athletes, see supra notes 66, 139 and accompanying text.
268. For a discussion of what drives professional athletes, see supra notes 21113 and accompanying text.
269. For a discussion of the economic circumstances of the average professional athlete, see supra note 213 and accompanying text.
270. For a discussion about likelihood that Stringer understood these risks,
see supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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necessary." 271 In contrast, the danger Stringer faced was not obvious to him, and the NFL-provided medical doctors, not Stringer,
should understand the relationship between the heat index, a
player's potential heat absorption, and the likelihood of resulting
injuries.272

b.

Voluntariness

The NFL will also argue that Stringer voluntarily assumed the
risks inherent in football when he chose professional football as his
career. 273 With regard to the risks related to practicing in the heat,
the NFL will claim that although training camps are mandatory, the
Vikings made water breaks and other relief available to Stringer,
2 74
Because Stringer played
but he did not take advantage of them.

for the six previous seasons and was selected as a Pro Bowl player,
the NFL may also contend that he felt less pressure to keep his position than other players, so if anything, playing past his limitations
27 5
could only be motivated by a voluntary, personal choice.
Kelci Stringer can rebut this argument by pointing to the overwhelming evidence that players, including her husband, do not
276 The devotion to a collective
have voluntary choices in football.
team identity often results in individual players ignoring their own
pain and limitations. 277 In addition, some football teams now even
include clauses in player contracts that give teams the right to take
away signing bonuses if a player publicly speaks negatively about his
coach or team. 2 78 The Ohio courts recognized in Snider v. Clermont
Central Soccer Association that employees realistically cannot ignore
271. See Meier, supra note 42, at 114 (quoting Benitez v. N.Y. City Bd. of
Educ., 541 N.E.2d 29, 32 (N.Y. 1989)); see also King v. Univ. of Indianapolis, NA 01233-C-B/H, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19070, at *13-15 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 3, 2002)
(describing rationale of holding).
272. For a discussion of medical views on heat exhaustion, see supranotes 8191, and accompanying text.
273. For a discussion on assumption of risk, see supra notes 132-56 and accompanying text.
274. For a discussion of the importance of water replenishment during foot-

ball practices, see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
275. For a discussion on group psychology in football, see supra notes 227-36
and accompanying text.
276. For elaboration on the group psychology of football, see supranotes 22736 and accompanying text.
277. For details on group psychology in football, see supra notes 227-36 and
accompanying text.
278. For a discussion of the recent policy adoption by one NFL team, see

supra note 236 and accompanying text.
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their employers' directives, even if those directives put them in
2 79
danger.
C.

Potential Creative Legal Arguments
Because Ms. Stringer has asserted the creative claim that the
NFL's "deadly culture" contributed to the heat exhaustion that ultimately killed her husband, creative legal arguments are needed to
substantiate the claim. Two possible arguments include an inherent compulsion argument, currently only used in New York, and a
public policy argument that appeals to the court's notions of equity
and justice.
1. Inherent Compulsion Analysis
In order to successfully argue an inherent compulsion theory,
Ms. Stringer will need to show two elements. First, she will need to
demonstrate that the NFL, a superior, directed her husband's actions; and second, that there was some form of economic duress
related to the directive. 28 0
a.

Superior's Directive to Act
The complaint refers to the NFL culture as one "which unreasonably subjects players to heat-related illness during practices, ostensibly out of the twisted belief that players benefit from being
subjected to such working conditions.

... 281

This "subjection" to

undesirable working conditions may be viewed as an implied directive by a superior. When offensive coach Mike Tice teased Stringer
in front of his teammates with the newspaper picture capturing his
279. See Snider v. Clermont Cent. Soccer Ass'n, No. CA98-07-056, 1999 Ohio
App. LEXIS 1126, at *11 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 22, 1999) (discussing court's
rationale).
280. For a discussion of the elements of inherent compulsion, see supra notes
163-67 and accompanying text.
281. See Complaint, supra note 11, at 7-8. Some of the other suit allegations
include that the NFL, and its medical advisor and head of the NFL Safety and
Injury Panel, Dr. John Lombardo:
[F]ailed to establish practice regulations for hot and/or humid conditions ....
[Flailed to establish procedures to ensure the proper acclimatization .... [F]ailed to establish practices and procedures, or even make
recommendations to member clubs ... for the adequate care and monitoring of players suffering heat exhaustion ....
[Flailed to require that

an adequate heat-related illness history be taken ....
Id. at 8-10.
Addressing only the NFL, the complaint alleges that "[t]he NFL has tolerated,
condoned, and fostered a culture among coaches, athletic trainers, and team physicians that subjects players to the conditions such as.. . extreme heat and humidity .... " Id. at 10.
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heat exhaustion symptoms from an earlier practice, he implied that
Stringer was weak, and that he should ignore future feelings of heat
28 2
The teasing from Tice, who
exhaustion in order to "be a man."

is now the head coach for the Vikings, demonstrates the traditional
culture of football, in which the greatest coaches are celebrated for

2 83
Perhaps years
demanding that their players push through pain.

of this coaching technique has made pain second nature for many
players, and has removed a player's ability to know or recognize his
physical limits.

284

It might also be argued that the inherent compulsion in football - the pressure to give 110% no matter what - came from

28 5 If group psychology asserts
Stringer's teammates, not a superior.

pressure on players, however, the group still learned this behavior

must make individual
through superiors who taught that players
286
sacrifices in order to achieve team goals.

b.

Economic Pressures

Even if Stringer was aware that heat exhaustion presented a
risk in football, there is much doubt that he could act upon his
2 87 NFL
worry due to the many economic considerations at stake.
28
With the pressure to
football careers last, on average, four years.

earn a lifetime of income within a short career, players feel that
they have no option but to accept whatever conditions - including
their
playing with pain or in extreme heat - are presented, because
289
economic window of opportunity is too short to object.

Like the scholarship pressure in the Benitez case, and the tryout
pressure in the Vargo case, NFL players constantly feel insecure
282. For the facts on Stringer's death, see supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text. If it is true that a group mentality exists in football, resulting in pressure,
Stringer would want to make up for his illness that day to his teammates by performing well on the day he collapsed and died. For a discussion on the group
mentality in football, see supra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
283. For a discussion about the great football coaches who used similar methods, see supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
284. For a discussion about the great football coaches who used similar methods, see supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
285. For a discussion on the group mentality in football, see supra notes 22736 and accompanying text.
286. For an elaboration of the group mentality in football, see supra notes
227-36 and accompanying text.
287. For a discussion of the economic reality for football players, see supra
note 213.
288. For a discussion of the length of an average football player's career, see
supra note 213.
289. For a discussion of the realities of football player's economic position,
see supra note 213.
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about their jobs for another reason. 29 0 Players are constantly reminded that there is someone to replace them if their performance
is not above and beyond expectations. 291 It seems that the second
prong of inherent compulsion is met because the economic pressure to perform is a consistent part of being an NFL football player.
2.

Public Policy Arguments

As quoted from Kleinknecht, the court will consider "[t] he hand
of history, our ideas of morals and justice, the convenience of administration of the rule, and our social ideas as to where the loss
should fall" when determining if a defendant has a duty of care. 29 2
These considerations favor each party differently.
a.

History and Tradition Favor the NFL

The court may be hesitant to trample the long history of football and the great traditions of past coaches, which not only built a
new American pastime, but also contributed to the American competitive spirit.29 3 Favoring the view that football plays an integral
role in society, the court may not want to interfere with how professional sports maintain and govern champion athletes. 294 The court
may also not want to open the door to a barrage of new litigation, as
allowing Ms. Stringer to collect in this case may send the message to
other potential plaintiffs that they too can collect from the deep
295
pockets of the NFL.
b.

Morals, Justice, and Notions of Fairness Favor Stringer

Even if the NFL did not have a duty of care to Stringer under a
traditional legal analysis, the court may believe it good public policy
to hold the NFL responsible for fostering a healthy, ethical culture,
especially in light of football's integral role in American society
290. See Benitez v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 541 N.E.2d 29, 32 (N.Y. 1989); see

also Vargo v. Svithchan, 301 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).

291. For a discussion about the pressure for football players to perform, see

supra notes 223-37 and accompanying text.
292. See Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360, 1372 (3d Cir.
1993) (quoting Gardner v. Consol. Rail Corp., 573 A.2d 1016, 1020 (Pa. 1990)
(quoting Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 681 (Pa. 1979))).

293. For a discussion of football's positive influence in America, see supra
notes 218-22 and accompanying text.
294. For a further illustration of football's positive influence in America, see

supra notes 218-22 and accompanying text.

295. For a discussion of the court's concerns, see supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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296
The NFL should not be allowed to
from which the NFL profits.
benefit from elite football athletes pushing themselves 110% and
then contend that those same athletes assumed their own risks if
they die. 297 If the NFL wants to keep its sport elite, it should recognize its duty to keep athletes within appropriate, healthy
298
boundaries.
There are good reasons to recognize the disproportionate
power held by the NFL compared to the average individual player.
Because NFL players only have, on average, four years to make a
lifetime of compensation, the NFL should bear the burden of tort
299
Like
loss, as it is not restrained by the same economic concerns.
NCAA "voluntary" practices, the court should consider that the
NFL possesses disproportionate power, which makes it unreasonathe August
ble that Stringer could have objected to practicing in
30 0
practice.
a
of
out
sat
heat and could have voluntarily

V.

IMPACT

"[S] port mirrors society. The values we reinforce in society are
30°1 The courts have the opporthe values we will reinforce in sport.
tunity to make sure the NFL takes this responsibility seriously.
Since the commencement of the Stringer lawsuit, several other
plaintiffs have also sued the NFL based on various aspects of its
culture.

30 2

There are quick and easy policies the NFL should adopt to reduce the chance of heat exhaustion for its players. First, the exhibi296. For a discussion of football's influence in America, see supra notes 21822 and accompanying text.
297. For a discussion of the NFL's concern over image relating to culture, see
supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
298. For a discussion of football's culture of pressure, see supra notes 223-26
and accompanying text.
299. For a discussion on the economic realities facing football players, see
supra note 213.
300. For a discussion on the NCAA "voluntary" practices, see supra notes 12931, 225 and accompanying text.
301. See Meier, supra note 42, at 144 (quoting DONALD CHU, DIMENSIONS OF
SPORT STUDIES 151 (1982)).

302. See Don Singleton, Suit Blames NFL in drunk-driving horror, N.Y. DAILY
NEws, Oct. 11, 2003 (describing parents' suit based on drunken football fan causavailable at http://www.
ing car accident resulting in daughter's paralysis),
7
nydailynews.com/news/v-pfriendly/story/125 41p-l12713c.html. The suit claims
that the "NFL has created 'a dangerous situation by causing and permitting visibly
intoxicated persons in great numbers to consume alcohol and then operate their
motor vehicles.'" Id. "[The] NFL has the authority to control the sale of alcoholic
beverages at their franchisee stadiums.'" Id.
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tion season should be shortened. 30 3 Fewer exhibition games would
ease the training schedule and allow for days of rest in between
practices. 30 4 Second, the summer training camps should be shortened. 30 5 Because modern professional athletes condition throughout the year, it does not take as long for them to prepare for the
season.30 6 Third, there should not be practices in extreme heat.30 7
Alternatives to practicing in the heat include going indoors to review videotapes and the playbook, practicing at night, or building a
08
3
covered practice facility.

But most of all, every football player, coach, and fan should
challenge the machoism culture that abounds in football.3 09 As
one ESPN commentator put it: "Everyone buys into this gladiator
nonsense .... Enough of that. [The players] are preparing to play
a game, not storm the beaches of Normandy. ' 31 0 The Stringer law-

suit challenges the machoism culture of football and, although
faced with many legal hurdles, could lay the important groundwork
for similar future challenges.
Kelly Basinger Charnley
303. See Caple, supra note 3 (noting that current exhibition seasons include
four games). The four games are not needed to decide starting players, or to rally
fans, but only to make money. NFL team owners require any season ticket purchaser to also purchase the four exhibition games. Id.
304. See id. (finding no reason exhibition season couldn't be shortened).
305. See id. (describing typical training camps as six weeks). A director of
sports medicine at the University of North Carolina, Dr. Fred Mueller, believes the
NFL should look at three things to prevent future heat strokes: first, the NFL
should change the time of the practices or make them shorter whenever there is a
high heat index; second, the NFL should not just make water breaks available, but
enforce them, requiring players to drink water; third, ensure that players are acclimatized to the temperature before putting them in full pads in the heat. See
George, supra note 4, at D4 (noting Dr. Mueller has studied data back to 1931
relating to heat stroke deaths in football).
306. See Caple, supra note 3; see also Patrick, supra note 2 ("While yesterday's
players had offseason jobs, football is now a full-time job.").
307. See Caple, supra note 3. The day Stringer died was the hottest in forty
years in that area of Minnesota, and there was a cow alert to spray down cattle. See
also Culture of Obesity, supra note 82, § 8, at 5 (noting how heat effects obese).
308. See Caple, supra note 3 (recommending safer practices in face of heat
exhaustion problems); see also Bauer, supra note 81, at 4 (recommending "to work
in environments that are shaded").
309. See Caple, supra note 3. For a discussion of why machoism in football
should be challenged, see supra notes 223-41 and accompanying text.
310. See Caple, supra note 3 (pointing out that even though Stringer had vomited several times and was carted off field day before, he was back at it harder than
ever very next day because "he felt the need to prove himself').
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